Self-study
Researcher: Support The vast majority of a person's dreams bear no resemblance whatsoever to real events that follow the dreams. █████ ██ ██ ████████████ ██ ███████ ████ ███ ███ ████████████ ██████████ ██████ ██ ███ █████ ██ ██████ ███ ███████ █████ ██████ █████ ██████ ████ ██████ █████ ███ ███████
It's Probably Just Coincidence
Sometimes you have a vivid dream and the event happens. Sure. But the vast majority of dreams have nothing to do with later events. Given that low base rate, the few apparent matches are most likely coincidence rather than evidence of psychic ability.
Notice the careful conclusion. The author isn't saying ESP doesn't exist. He's saying it's unreasonable to believe in ESP solely on the basis of a few coincident dreams. He's criticizing a particular line of reasoning, not taking a position on the underlying claim. That distinction might matter.
Anticipation
For Parallel Reasoning, we match the structure. We're looking for an argument with three pieces working together: (1) an acknowledgment that sometimes two things appear together, (2) a premise that most of the time they don't, and (3) a conclusion that it's unreasonable to draw a particular causal conclusion from the few cases where the two things appear together. The conclusion should criticize a line of reasoning, not take a position on the underlying claim itself.
26.
Which one of the following █████████ ██ ████ ███████ ██ ███ █████████ ██ ███ ████████ ██████
a
It is unreasonable ██ ███████ ████ █ ███ ████ █████ █████ ███████ ████ ██ ██ ███████ ██████ █████████████ ██ ████ █ ███ █████████ ████ ███ █████ ███████ ███████ ██ █████ ███████ ██ ████████ ██████ ████ ███ ██████████ ██████████
This is an "insufficient data" argument, not a "this is probably coincidence" argument. (A) says we shouldn't conclude the drug works because most new drugs need testing on large numbers of patients before they're considered effective. That's a claim about needing more data. The stimulus doesn't say "we don't have enough dream data." It says "most dreams don't match later events, so the few that do are probably coincidence." Different reasoning, even though the surface vocabulary ("unreasonable to believe") looks similar.
b
Many people who ███████ ███████ ███ ██████ ████ ██ █████████ ████████████ ██ ██ ██ ████████████ ██ ███████ ████ ███████ ███ ██████ ██ ██████████ ████ ██████ █████ ███████ ████████ ████ ██████ ██ █████
(B) has three mismatches. The biggest is the conclusion. (B) says "it is unreasonable to believe that surgery for ulcers is effective," which is a position on whether the surgery works. The stimulus's conclusion is narrower. "It is unreasonable to believe ESP exists solely on the basis of a few coincident dreams" is a critique of a specific line of reasoning, not a position on whether ESP exists.
There's also a strength problem. The stimulus's premise is about the vast majority of dreams. (B)'s premise is about many people showing no long-term improvement. "Many" and "most" aren't the same. The stimulus's reasoning depends on the apparent connection failing in the vast majority of cases (so the few matches look like coincidence). "Many people don't improve" doesn't carry that force, since many other people could improve, with no clear majority either way.
And one more problem: "show no long-term improvement" isn't the same as "don't benefit." A patient could show no long-term improvement but still benefit in the short term. So even if "many" had been "most," (B)'s premise wouldn't establish what the parallel needs.
c
Even though many ██████ ████████ ██████████ ██████████ ███████ ████████ ██████ ████ ██ ██ ████████████ ██ ███████ ████ ███ ████████ ██████ ███ ██████ ████ ███████████ ███████ ███████ ███ █████ ██ ██ ████████ ██ ██████ ██████████
(C) shares the conclusion problem with (B). It says "it is unreasonable to believe that not drinking herbal tea causes such remissions," which is a position on the causal claim itself rather than a critique of how someone might reach that claim. The stimulus's conclusion is the narrower "unreasonable on the basis of" version.
Beyond that, (C)'s premise doesn't establish the low base rate the stimulus relies on. "Several factors are known to be relevant to cancer remission" tells us there are multiple causes; it doesn't tell us most cases of not-drinking-herbal-tea fail to produce remission. The stimulus needs that "most of the time the connection doesn't hold" premise in order to be parallel. (C) doesn't have it.
d
A number of ██████ ███ ███ ███████████ ████ ████████ ███ ██ ██ ████████████ ██ ████████ ████ ███████ ██ ██████████ ████ ██████ ███ ████ ███████ ██ ███ ███ ████████████
This is the most parallel. The first sentence acknowledges that the two things sometimes appear together ("a number of people who die prematurely take aspirin"), just as the stimulus acknowledges that some dreams match later events. The third sentence establishes the low base rate ("most people who take aspirin do not die prematurely"), just as the stimulus does with "the vast majority of dreams bear no resemblance to real events that follow." And the conclusion is the same kind of move: don't draw a causal conclusion from the few apparent coincidences.
e
A significant number ██ ████████ ██████ ████ █████ █████ ███████ ███████ ██ ██ ██ ████████████ ██ ████ █ ██████████ ███████ ██████ ████ █████ █████ ███ ██████████ ███████ ████ ██████ ████ ██████ ██████ ████ █████ █████ █████ ███████ ███████
The stimulus argues against drawing a causal conclusion (don't conclude ESP from a few coincident dreams). (E) argues in favor of one ("it is unreasonable to deny a connection between power lines and cancer").