Self-study
One approach to the question of which objects discussed by a science are real is to designate as real all and only those entities posited by the most explanatorily powerful theory of the science. ███ █████ ████ ██████████ ████████ ███████ ████████ ███████ ██████ ██ ███████████ ████████ ████ ████████ ██ ███████
Summary
The author concludes that it’s wrong to designate all and only those entities posited by the most explanatorily powerful theory of a science as real. (In other words, there are some things posited by the most explanatorily powerful theory of a science that are NOT real.)
What makes the author believe this?
Because most scientific theories posit some entities solely on theoretical grounds.
Notable Assumptions
The author assumes that if an entity is posited on solely theoretical grounds, then it’s not real. This is why the author believes that there are some things that are posited by the most explanatorily powerful theory of a science that are NOT real, and that it would be wrong to designate them as real.
11.
Which one of the following ███████████ ██ ██████ ████ █████ ██ ███████ ███ █████████ ██████
a
Any object that ██ ███████ ██ █ ██████████ ██████ ███ ████ ████████ ███ ███████████ █████ ██ ████ ██████ ██████ ██ ██████████ ██ █████
The idea that certain objects “enhance the explanatory power of a theory” doesn’t connect to any of the concepts in the premise. We know from the premise that most scientific theories contain entities posited solely on theoretical grounds. But we don’t know whether these entities enhance explanatory power. So (A) doesn’t strengthen the argument.
b
Objects posited for ███████████ ███████ ████ ██████ █████ ██ ██████████ ██ █████
(B) builds a bridge from the premise to the conclusion. We know from a premise that most scientific theories posit some entities solely on theoretical grounds. (B), then, allows us to infer that these entities shouldn’t be considered real. So if an approach would designate these entities as real, that approach must be flawed.
c
A scientific theory ██████ ███ █████ ███ ██████ ████ ████ ███ ███████ ███ ███████████ █████ ██ ███ ███████
(C) is directed toward telling a scientific theory that it shouldn’t posit a certain kind of entity. But we’re trying to show that certain entities posited by theories shouldn’t be designated as real; we’re not trying to show that certain entities shouldn’t be posited.
d
A scientific theory ██████ █████████ █████ ████████ ██ ███████ █████ ████ ███████████ █████
(D) helps support a conclusion that a scientific theory should sometimes posit certain entities. But we’re trying to show that certain entities posited by theories shouldn’t be designated as real; we’re not trying to show that scientifies theories should posit certain entities.
e
Only objects posited ██ █████████████ ████████ ████████ ██████ ██ ██████████ ██ █████
(E) would allow us to infer that objects that are not posited by explanatorily powerful theories shouldn’t be designed as real. But the premise doesn’t establish that we’re dealing with any scientific theories that are not explanatorily powerful. So (E) doesn’t interact with the premise and therefore doesn’t strengthen the argument.