As premises, this argument sets up a chain of conditional claims: figures of speech are used for emotional impact; expressions used for emotional impact are used by poets. The stimulus then concludes that being an expression used by poets is a sufficient condition for being a figure of speech. Like the stimulus, (A) confuses the necessary and sufficient conditions: the premises would allow us to conclude that being a figure of speech is a sufficient condition for being an expression used by poets, but (A) concludes the reverse.

Wrong flaw. (B) appears to give a conditional chain: political systems whose laws originate in elected legislatures are prone to factionalism; factionalism leads to civil disorder. However, “prone to factionalism” is not the same as “becomes facionalist”, so we’re unable to link the claims. Also unlike the stimulus, (B) doesn’t confuse the necessary and sufficient conditions in its conclusion; rather it commits the flaw of adding in a whole new term (autocrats), thereby rendering its conclusion unsupportable by the given premises.

Wrong flaw. Like the stimulus, this argument is flawed because of a sufficient vs. necessary condition confusion: “animal that fights” is a necessary condition in the premises and a sufficient condition in the conclusion. Unlike the stimulus, though, (C)’s premises are a series of facts (about animals with horns or antlers) that do not link together to form a chain. That makes (C)’s structure fundamentally different from the stimulus’ structure.

Wrong flaw. Unlike the stimulus, (D)’s premises do not form a chain of conditional claims. The conclusion also does not come from a sufficient vs. necessary condition confusion. Rather, the conclusion commits a different sort of argument form error: it creates a conditional link between short-story writers and blues musicians despite the fact that there is no sufficiency and necessity relationship between the two, based on the premises.

Wrong flaw. Unlike the stimulus, (E)’s premises do not link to form a chain of conditional claims. (E) is flawed in that its conclusion (people living in democratic countries can’t be free) introduces a new concept (personal freedom) that is not addressed in the premises.