Reza: Language requires the use of verbal signs for objects as well as for feelings. ████ ███████ ███ ███████ ███████ ███████ ███ ████ ██████ ███ ███ ███ ██ ███ ██ ██ █████ ██ ██████ ███ ███ █████ ██████ █████ ███ ███████ ████████ ███ ███████ ██ ███████████ █████ ███████ ████ █████ ████████ █████ ██ ████ ████████ ██████████ ████████
The stimulus can be diagrammed as follows:
Conceptual thought is a necessary condition for language use.
Animals do not have language.
If all of Reza's statements ███ █████ ████ █████ ███ ██ ███ █████████ ████ ████ ██ █████
Conceptual thought is ████████ ███ █████████
This must be true. As shown in the diagram, by chaining the conditional claims, we see that conceptual thought is a necessary condition for language.

Conceptual thought requires ███ ███ ██ ██████ █████ ███ ████████
This could be false. (B) says “Conceptual thought → Use of verbal signs for objects.” In our diagram, we only have conceptual thought as a necessary condition; we don’t know what conceptual thought is a sufficient condition for.
It is not ████████ ██ █████ ████████████ █████ █████████
This could be false. We have no information about which topics are possible to think about conceptually.
All humans are ███████ ██ ██████████ ████████
This could be false. In our diagram, “human” is a necessary condition for “use of verbal signs for objects.” We are not given “humans” as a sufficient condition for anything, so we don’t know anything that “all humans” can do.
The vocal expressions ██ ███████ █████ ████ ██████ ██ ███ ███████ ██████████ ████████
This could be false. We know that many animals can vocally express at least one feeling (hunger). It could be the case that vocal expression of hunger requires conceptual thought; our stimulus just doesn’t address this.