Ethicist: Conclusion It would be a mistake to say that just because someone is not inclined to do otherwise, she or he does not deserve to be praised for doing what is right, for although we do consider people especially virtuous if they successfully resist a desire to do what is wrong, Support they are certainly no less virtuous if they have succeeded in extinguishing all such desires.
The ethicist refutes the idea that those with no urge to do wrong don’t deserve praise for doing what is right. Why is that idea flawed? People who have eliminated all “bad” desires are just as virtuous as those who successfully resist those desires.
The referenced claim is a general belief that the ethicist counters with support for her argument, i.e. “they are certainly no less virtuous if...”.
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