If you’re working with a solid stimulus template, (A) should feel vaguely different enough that you give it a “meh” on your shallow dip. Ideally, you’d never return. Here’s the deep dive, though.

(A) does set up a condition that’s necessary to achieve a goal:

If we want to prevent the company from downsizing, we need to issue more stock.

(If the above translation is confusing, review unless as a group 3 indicator.)

To match the stimulus, (A) should proceed by saying we probably won’t issue more stock, and concluding the company will probably downsize.

But (A) deviates from that in two core ways. First, those “probably”s are missing, replaced by certainty – “no more stock is being issued.”

Second, instead of just concluding the company will downsize, (A) tacks on a whole new inference beyond that (“Furthermore” should strike you as sus on your shallow dip), saying if the company downsizes the stockholders will demand a change. This additional conditional chain element doesn’t occur in the stimulus.

If you’re working with a solid stimulus template, (B) should feel vaguely different enough that you give it a “meh” on your shallow dip. Ideally, you’d never return. Here’s the deep dive, though.

(B) does set up a condition that’s necessary to achieve a goal:

If we want Rodriguez to donate her paintings to the museum, we need to name the new wing after her.

To match the stimulus, (B) should proceed by saying we probably won’t name the new wing after her, and concluding Rodriguez probably won’t donate her paintings to the museum.

The cleanest mismatch comes in the conclusion, which says Rodriguez certainly will donate her paintings. That’s off in both the likelihood department and the will/won’t department.

Let that mismatch suffice. If you’re curious about the gardens and Wu, complain in the comments and I’ll give you a big long breakdown of why that nonsense is slightly off base as well.

Finally, note that (B) confuses sufficiency for necessity. The premises strongly suggest that the new wing will be named after Rodriguez, which is a necessary condition for her donation. Yet, it concludes that Rodriguez will donate.

If you’re working with a solid stimulus template, (C) should feel so random and mismatching that you eliminate it on your shallow dip. I’d say (C) actually gets more tempting on a deep dive, so avoiding it before you get there is highly valuable.

The cleanest way to dispense with (C) is to note that all its claims are certain, not probable. That’s enough.

Which is good, because if you force a necessary - sufficient structure, you arguably find a matching one:

If you want to be good business partners, you must [get along and such].
But Rey and Khri don’t get along (they squabblin’).
Therefore, they won’t be good business partners.

That’s honestly pretty close. Much closer than it appears on the shallow dip. But anyway, the point about mismatched likelihood still stands.

(D) preserves both the stimulus’ necessary - sufficient structure and its probabilistic claims. First the necessary condition, which happens to use the same “only if” phrasing as the stimulus:

If Lopez wants to win the marathon, his sponsors must keep him well hydrated.

To match the stimulus, (D) should proceed by saying his sponsors probably won’t hydrate him very well, and concluding Lopez probably won’t win the marathon. And that’s exactly what happens.

You might have noticed the interesting gap between “Lopez’s sponsors are known to be bad hydrators.” and “Lopez’s sponsors probably won’t hydrate him well.” The jump between those two ideas is pretty reasonable, but arguably a bit too brittle to pass muster in, say, a Must Be True question.

If you’re hung up on it, I don’t think the answer is to convince yourself those concepts are absolutely, 100% the same. Instead, I think the lesson is that tiny little jumps like this one are allowed in Parallel questions, where the main focus is on preserving structure.

(E) fails to preserve the stimulus’ probabilistic language, which should make it fail your shallow dip. All its claims are certain.

Beyond that, (E) confuses sufficiency for necessity. Its core conditional claim uses “if” instead of “only if,” and therefore reads like this:

If we want to offer the new course in the spring, it suffices to have a qualified instructor available.

That means finding a qualified instructor will guarantee we can offer the course in the spring. We don’t know whether a qualified instructor is necessary.

The argument acts as if a qualified instructor is necessary, though, saying we don’t have one and therefore can’t offer the course in the spring.