Passage A
There are two principles that are fundamental to a theory of justice regarding property. The principle of justice in acquisition specifies the conditions under which someone can legitimately come to own something that was previously not owned by anyone. The principle of justice in transfer specifies the conditions under which the transfer of property from one person to another is justified.
Given such principles, if the world were wholly just, the following definition would exhaustively cover the subject of justice regarding property:
1. A person who acquires property in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that property.
2. A person who acquires property in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, from someone else who is entitled to the property, is entitled to the property.
3. No one is entitled to any property except by (repeated) applications of 1 and 2.
However, not all actual situations are generated in accordance with the principles of justice in acquisition and justice in transfer. Some people steal from others or defraud them, for example. The existence of past injustice raises the issue of the rectification of injustice. If past injustice has shaped present ownership in various ways, what, if anything, ought to be done to rectify that injustice? A principle of rectification would use historical information about previous situations and injustices done in them, and information about the actual course of events that flowed from these injustices, to produce a description of the property ownership that should have resulted. Actual ownership of property must then be brought into conformity with this description.
Passage B
In 1790, the United States Congress passed the Indian Nonintercourse Act, which requires that all transfers of lands from Native Americans to others be approved by the federal government. The law has not been changed in any relevant respect, and it remains in effect today. Its purpose is clear. It was meant to guarantee security to Native Americans against fraudulent acquisition by others of the Native Americans' land holdings. Several suits have been initiated by Native American tribes for recovery of lands held by them when the Nonintercourse Act took effect.
One natural (one might almost say obvious) way of reasoning about Native American claims to land in North America is this: Native Americans were the first human occupants of this land. Before the European invasion of North America, the land belonged to them. In the course of that invasion and its aftermath, the land was illicitly taken from them. The current owners lack a well-founded right to the land, which now lies illicitly in their hands. Ideally, the land should be restored to its rightful owners. This may be impractical; compromises might have to be made. But the original wrong can most easily be righted by returning the land to them—or by returning it wherever that is feasible.
Which one of the following most accurately describes the main purpose for which passage A was written and the main purpose for which passage B was written?
Passage A: to propose a solution to a moral problem
Passage B: to criticize a proposed solution to a moral problem
It’s not clear whether Passage A proposes a solution something. But even if you think it does, Passage B doesn’t criticize a proposed solution. It articulates a potential way to handle Native American claims.
Passage A: to sketch a general outline of a branch of moral theory
Passage B: to give a particular moral analysis of a real case
This is the best answer. Passage A sketches a general outline of a branch of moral theory — theory of justice regarding property. We get general principles for justice regarding property. Passage gives a particular moral analysis of a real case — the real case is Native American land claims. The particular moral analysis is the reasoning laid out in the last paragraph of Passage B.
Passage A: to spell out the details of two fundamental principles
Passage B: to examine a case that exemplifies a moral ideal
The case discussed in Passage B isn’t used as an example of a moral ideal. Passage B doesn’t suggest Native American land claims stand for some broader point. In addition, Passage A involved more than just two principles (we also got the principle of rectification).
Passage A: to argue for a particular moral ideal
Passage B: to question the assumptions of a moral theory
Passage A doesn’t argue for a moral ideal; it focuses on describing principles that are part of the theory of justice regarding property. Also, Passage B doesn’t question anything underlying a moral theory. It simply reasons about a specific situation involving property transfer.
Passage A: to advocate the use of certain moral principles
Passage B: to provide a counterexample to some widely held moral principles
Passage A doesn’t advocate for the use of certain principles. It simply describes principles that are part of the theory of justice regarding property. Also, Passage B doesn’t use the Native American land claims as a counterexample against certain principles.