Self-study
Historian: Support It is unlikely that someone would see history as the working out of moral themes unless he or she held clear and unambiguous moral beliefs. ████████ █████ ███████████ ██ ███████ █████ █████ ████████ █████████ ██ █████ █████████ ██ ███████ ██████████ █████████████ ███ ████ ███████ █ ██████ ██████ ███ ████ ██████ ████ ██████ ██ ██ ████ ███████ ██ ███ ███████ ███ ██ █████ ███████
Summary
The author concludes that the more history a person knows, the less likely that person will view history as the working out of moral themes. This is based on the following:
If one does not hold clear and unambiguous moral beliefs, then it’s unlikely one will see history as the working out of moral themes.
As one gains knowledge of history, one will tend to be less likely to morally judge human behavior.
Missing Connection
We’re trying to get from “more history a person knows” to “less likely to see history as working out of moral themes.”
We have a premise that tells us “more history a person knows” leads to “less inclined to morally judge human behavior.” And we have a premise that tells us “not holding clear and unambiguous moral beliefs” leads to “less likely to see history as working out of moral themes.” So there’s a way to get from “more history a person knows” to “less likely to see history as working out of moral themes,” as long as we add the following to connect the two premises:
“less inclined to morally judge human behavior” implies “less likely to hold clear and unambiguous moral beliefs”
24.
The conclusion of the argument ██ ████████ █████ ██ █████ ███ ██ ███ █████████ ██ ████████
a
Historical events that ████ ██ ██████ █████ ███████████ ███ █████████ ███ ██████████ ██ █████████ █ █████ ██████
Adding (A) to the argument doesn’t create a connection between “less inclined to morally judge human behavior” and “less likely to have clear and unambiguous moral beliefs.” So we still cannot get from “more history one knows” to “less likely to view history as the working out of moral themes.”
b
The less inclined ███ ██ ██ ███████ █████ █████ █████████ ███ ████ ██████ ██ ██ ████ ███ █████ █████ ███ ███████████ █████ ████████
(B) allows us to chain the two premises together to form the following:
more history a person knows → less inclined to morally judge human behavior → not holding clear and unambiguous moral beliefs → less likely to see history as working out of moral themes
c
Only those who ██ ███ ██████████ █████ ███████ █████████ █████ ████████████ ██ ██████████ ███████
The conclusion concerns what happens as one’s knowledge of history increases. But neither the conclusion nor premises involve the absolute category of “those who do not understand history.” So (C) does not establish that the more history one knows, the less likely one is to view history as the working out of moral themes.
d
The more clear ███ ███████████ █████ █████ ████████ ███ ████ ██████ ███ ██ ██ ████ ███████ ██ ███ ███████ ███ ██ █████ ███████
Even if (D) were added to the premises, we still have no connection between “less inclined to morally judge human behavior” and “less likely to have clear and unambiguous moral beliefs.” So we still cannot get from “more history one knows” to “less likely to view history as the working out of moral themes.”
e
People tend to ██ ████ █████████ █████████ █ ███████ █████ █████ ████ ███████ █████████ █████████ ████ █████████ █ ███████ █████ █████ ████ ██ ███ ███████ █████████ ██████████
The quality of being “less objective regarding a subject” has no connection to the concepts in the argument. With (E), we still have no connection between “less inclined to morally judge human behavior” and “less likely to have clear and unambiguous moral beliefs.” So we still cannot get from “more history one knows” to “less likely to view history as the working out of moral themes.”