This tells us that Shimada criticizes McFeney's tardiness without criticizing his own. That's exactly what we want. If Shimada doesn't criticize tardiness in himself (from (A)) and doesn't vow to stop being tardy (from the application's "if" clause), then both conditions of the principle are met, and we can conclude that Shimada should not criticize McFeney for tardiness.

The fact that Shimada is almost never tardy doesn't tell us whether he criticizes tardiness in himself. Someone who is rarely tardy could still criticize tardiness in themselves on the rare occasions it happens, or they could not. Since we don't know, we can't confirm that the sufficient condition of the principle is met.

This tells us that McFeney criticizes Shimada, but we need to know whether Shimada criticizes tardiness in himself. The fact that neither of them vows to stop being tardy satisfies one condition, but we still don't know whether Shimada criticizes his own tardiness. Without that, we can't confirm both parts of the sufficient condition are met.

This actually works against the application. (D) tells us Shimada does criticize himself for occasional tardiness. That means that one part of the sufficient condition of the principle (not criticizing the behavior in oneself) is not met. In that case, we can't conclude that Shimada shouldn't criticize tardiness in others.

As with (B), the fact that Shimada is not regularly tardy doesn't tell us whether he criticizes tardiness in himself. The principle doesn't care about whether Shimada is tardy. It cares about whether he criticizes tardiness in himself or vows to stop it.