Self-paced
Dillworth: More and more people are deciding not to have children because of the personal and economic sacrifices children require and because so often children are ungrateful for the considerable sacrifices their parents do make for them. ████████ ████ ██████████████ ████ ██ ███████ ██ ███ ████ ████ █████ ████████ ███████ ███ ████ ██████ ████ ██████ ████ ██ ████████ ████ █████ ██████ ████ ██ █████ █████ ██████████ ███ ██████ ████ ██████ ████ ███████ █████████ ██████████ ███ ██ ██████████ ██ ████ ██████████ ███ █████ ██████ █████████ ███ ██ ████████ █████ ████████ ██ █ ████████
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Dillworth's Argument
Dillworth concludes that people with deeply held values should probably have children despite the drawbacks of doing so. (Said drawbacks being personal and financial sacrifice, plus children's ingratitude.) Why? Because according to Dillworth, having children is the best chance of ensuring one's values survive, regardless of the drawbacks.
Essentially, Dillworth is saying that for those with deeply held values, the pros of having children outweigh the cons. If one's values are the most important consideration, then ensuring they survive is worth all the costs of parenthood.
Travers' Argument
Travers brings in some important new evidence: that children's ingratitude is usually due to rejecting their parents' values. This casts the drawbacks of having children in a new light. Maybe ingratitude isn't just a cost that's worth it to pass on one's values—it could actually signal a threat to the goal of ensuring one's values survive.
This is the implied conclusion that Travers argues towards: that Dillworth is wrong to say children's ingratitude has "no bearing" on passing on one's values. Travers doesn't directly disagree with Dillworth's conclusion, but suggests that Dillworth misunderstands the relevant considerations.
19.
The point of Travers’ rejoinder ██ █████████████ ████████ ██ ████
a
Dillworth’s assumption that ████████ ███████ ██████ ████ ████ █████ ███████ ██ ████████
Dillworth never assumes that children get their values only from their parents, so there's nothing here for Travers to disagree with. And in fact, Travers doesn't discuss where children get their values.
b
it is a ███████ ██ ███████ ██ ██████████ ███ ████████ ███ ████████ ██████████ ██████ ███ ██████ ██ ██ ████ ███ ███ ████ ██ █████ ████████
Dillworth does dismiss these sacrifices as
c
Dillworth has overlooked ███ ██████████ ████ ████ ██████ ████ ██████ ████ ██████ ███ ████████████ ██████ ████████ ██████ ████ ███ ██████ ████ ██ ██████
Dillworth's argument isn't about different values coming into conflict, so there's no point in Travers pointing this out. Travers discusses the case of children rejecting their parents' values, but for a different purpose: to show that children's ingratitude is actually relevant to the goal of passing on one's values.
d
the desire to ██████████ █████ ██████ ██████ ███ ██ █ ██████ ██ ██████████ ████████ ██ ████ ████████
Travers doesn't disagree with wanting to pass on one's values as a reason to have children. Travers' point is just that it's not that simple: children's ingratitude isn't merely a cost that must be borne, but an actual threat to this goal.
e
the fact that ████████ ███ █████ ██████████ ███ ████████ ██████████ ██ ███ ██████████ ██ ████████ ███████ ██ ████ ████████ ██ █████ ██ ██████████ ███████ ██████
Dillworth says children's ingratitude has