PT21.S3.Q17

PrepTest 21 - Section 3 - Question 17

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An editorial in the . █████████ █████ ██████ ██████ ████ █████████████ ██████ █████ █████████ ███████ ███ ██████ ██ ███ █████████ █████ ███ ██ ███████ ██ ███ █████████ ████ ████████ ███ █████████ █████ ███ █████ ██ █ ██████ ██████ ████ █████ ████ ██ ███████ ██ █████████████ ██████████ ██████ █████ ████ ███ █████ ████ ██████████ ██ ███ ██ █████ █████ ████ ████████ ████ ███████ ██████████

Argument Breakdown

An editorial comes to the conclusion that overall, voters in Grandburg would be happy for the political party currently in control of the city council to lose. The editorial's evidence for this is a recent survey, which found that a majority of registered voters in Grandburg think that the political party will lose the next election.

Let's take a second to compare the editorial's support to its conclusion. The editorial's support deals with what voters think will happen—the survey doesn't ask about preferences, just for a prediction. The conclusion, on the other hand, makes a claim about what voters would like to happen—they want to see this political party out. That means there's a gap between the editorial's premise and its conclusion.

Objective: Strengthen the Editorial's Conclusion

Since we've identified a gap in the argument, one of the easiest ways we can strengthen is by bridging that gap and helping the premise better support the conclusion. An answer that takes this approach to strengthening could say something like "when most voters predict a certain electoral outcome, that is also most voters' preferred outcome."

It's also possible the correct answer could come at the argument from a different direction. Even when we have a good prediction, keeping an open mind can help us to spot an unexpected answer. Whatever the correct answer is, it will support the idea that voters generally want the current political party to lose. Anything that doesn't make that more likely, we can eliminate.

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17.

Which one of the following ██ █ █████████ █████ ██ ████████████ █████ ███████ ███ █████████ █████████████ ███ ███ █████████████ ███████████

a

The way voters ████ █████ █ █████████ █████ ██ █ █████ ████ ███ ██████████ ██ ██████████ █ ████████ █████████ ██ ███ ███ ████ ████ ████████ ██ ████ █████ ████ ██████ ███████ █████████████ █████████ █████████████

(A) might make a future prediction more reliable, but a prediction of the future isn't at issue here. We need to bridge between the evidence about what voters think will happen, and the conclusion about what voters want to happen. That all deals with voters' present beliefs and feelings.

b

The results of ███████ ████ █████ ███████ █████ █████████ ██████ █ █████ █████████ █████ ███ ████████████ ██ ████ ██ ███ █████ ███ ██████ ██████ █████ ███ ██████ ██████ █████████ ██ ████ █████████ ██████

If the editorial's conclusion was that the political party would likely lose the next election, (B) could strengthen. But the editorial isn't making a prediction about the election; it's making a claim about voters' preferences for this political party to lose. (B) doesn't help bridge the gap between what voters think is likely and what voters want to see happen.

c

An increase in ███████████ ██████ █ █████████ █████ ████ ██ ██ █████ ███ ██████████ ██ ████████ ██ ██████ ██ █ █████████████ ████████ ██ ███████ ███ █████ █████████ ████████

The editorial doesn't mention rival political parties at all, so we can immediately be skeptical of (C). In fact, (C) takes for granted the conclusion that voters dislike the current political party—but that's what we're trying to strengthen. (C) doesn't give us any more reason to believe voters actually dislike this party.

d

The proportion of ██████ ███ ██████ █ █████ █████████ ███████████ ██ ██ ████████ ███ ████████████ ██ ███████ ██ ███████████ ███ ██████████ ██ ██████ ███ ███ ██ █████ ██ ████ ███████████ █████ █████████

Breaking down (D) into more accessible language, it tells us that whatever proportion of voters think a political result will happen, about the same proportion of voters want that result to happen. This lets us bridge the gap in the argument between the premise addressing what voters think will happen, and the conclusion about what voters want to happen.

Since 59 percent of voters think the current party will lose, (D) lets us infer that about 59 percent of voters want the party to lose.

e

It can reasonably ██ ███████ ████ ██████████ ██████ ███ ███████ ██ █ ██████ █████████ ███ ███████ ██ █ ██████ ████████ ████ ████████ █████ █████ ██ ████ ██ ████ █████████

(E) is similar to (A) and (B): it could support a conclusion about the next election result, but doesn't support the conclusion about how voters feel. It doesn't matter for the argument whether or not everyone surveyed will vote. What matters is whether they actually want the current party to lose, or if they just think that's a likely outcome.

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