Self-study
Support If the recording now playing on the jazz program is really "Louis Armstrong recorded in concert in 1989," as the announcer said, then Louis Armstrong was playing some of the best jazz of his career years after his death. █████ ███ █████████ ███ ██████████ █████ ██████████ ███████ ███ █████████ ████ ████ ██████ ███ ████ ██ ███ █████████ ██████
Structure: Counter-Argument
The stimulus is centered on the announcer's argument or assertion that the recording is of "Louis Armstrong recorded in concert in 1989." The author points out that this assertion can't be accurate, because Louis Armstrong died well before 1989. Since it is Louis Armstrong on the recording, the author concludes that the announcer has gotten the date of the recording wrong.
Analysis of Reasoning Pattern
This is an unusual argument pattern. It's worth noting that the point of the argument is to explain how, exactly, someone else's assertion is incorrect. We know the announcer's statement is incorrect because of the first sentence, which is framed as a conditional saying that if the announcer's identification is correct, then Louis Armstrong was playing music after his death. Instead of diagramming this out, just notice how this assumes the contrapositive: the point is that since Louis Armstrong can't have been playing music after he died, the announcer's identification is incorrect.
But the author then points out that the trumpeter is definitely Louis Armstrong. So the announcer isn't completely mistaken. This effectively narrows down the "options" for how the announcer could be mistaken: as the author concludes, the announcer must somehow have been confused about the date.
The pattern we're looking for, then, might be similar to one where someone else's argument is shown to be incorrect, but not in all regards. One part of it might be correct, which allows us to conclude that the mistake occurs in another part.
17.
The pattern of reasoning in ███ ████████ █████ ██ ████ ███████ ██ ████ ██ █████ ███ ██ ███ █████████ ██████████
a
The museum is ████████ ██ ██████ ████████ █ ████████ ███ ███████ ████████ ██ ██████ ███ ████ ██ ██████ ███ ███████ ███ █ █████████ ███ █ ████████ ██ ███ ██████ ████ ██ █████ █████ ███ ███████████ █████ █ █████████
This isn't what we're looking for. Remember that the stimulus questioned an identification because it led to an impossible conclusion. In this case, the fact that Hoffman was a sculptor doesn't necessarily rule out that she made a painting. More significantly, the stimulus also affirmed one aspect of the identification as factual: the announcer was correct that Louis Armstrong was playing. In this answer choice, no part of the identification is explicitly affirmed as factual. The idea that Hoffman really made this piece of art is assumed, as is the idea that, because she was a sculptor, she could not have made any paintings, and therefore this piece of art must not be a painting. This is a different structure than what we're looking for.
b
This painting titled ██ ████████ ██ ██████ █████████ ██ ████████ ████ ██ █ ████████ ███ ██ ██ ███ ███████ ██ ███ ████ █████ █████ ███████ ███ ██ ██ ███ ██████ ██ █████ ████ ████████ ████ ███████ ████ ████ ██████████
This is similar to the argument in the stimulus, but doesn't go far enough. Remember that the stimulus started with a conditional rule: if the announcer's identification was correct, then Louis Armstrong was playing well after he was dead:
correct → playing after dead
But notice that the stimulus doesn't bother to explicitly state that Louis Armstrong can't have been playing after he was dead. The impossibility of that scenario is assumed, as is the implication (by the contrapositive) that the identification is incorrect. Then the stimulus adds a new factual premise — the trumpeter in the recording is definitely Louis Armstrong — and comes to a conclusion about how the identification is incorrect.
This answer choice starts in a similar way, with a conditional leading to an impossible scenario:
La Toilette → two museums at once
But instead of assuming the contrapositive, as the stimulus does, and adding a new premise to show how the identification is incorrect, this statement explicitly states that the necessary condition is impossible, and then jumps to the conclusion that the painting is mistitled. (Notice that this conclusion overlooks the possibility that the painting is called "La Toilette," but is not by Berthe Morisot). This is a different argument structure than what we're looking for.
c
Only if a █████████████████ ███████ ██████ ███████ ██ █████ ██████ ███ ███████████ ███████ ███ ████ ████ ████ ██ ███ █████ ██████ ██ ███████ ███ ███ ███████████████████ ████████ █████████ ██ ███████ ██ ███ █████ ██ ██ ████ ██ ███████ ██ ███ ███ █████ ██ ██████
Correct. It's important to see that though the first sentence is expressed in different language, it expresses the same idea as the first sentence of the stimulus. For a certain identification of a piece of art to be correct would require an impossible scenario — in this case, for a "twentieth-century Mexican artist" to be working in seventeenth-century Japan.
Like the stimulus, and unlike (B), the answer choice doesn't bother to point out explicitly that that scenario is impossible — it just assumes it. The answer choice then points out a fact about the work of art: it is a Japanese landscape. This eliminates the option that the painting is by Frida Kahlo and is not a Japanese landscape, just like knowing that Louis Armstrong was definitely the trumpeter eliminates the option that the recording was made by someone else in 1989. Thus, the answer choice concludes that the label attributing the work of art to Frida Kahlo is incorrect. This parallels the structure of the stimulus.
d
Unless Käthe Kollwitz ███ ████ █ ████████ ███ █ ███████████ ███ █████████ ██████ █████ ██ █████ ██ ███ ███████████ ██ ████ ██████████ █████ ████ ████████ ██ █████ ███ ██ ███ ███████ ███ █████ ████ ██ ██████
This is a very different structure than what we're looking for. It gives us a conditional rule — the guide is wrong unless Kollwitz was both a sculptor and a printmaker — and then applies that rule directly: Kollwitz was "known for her prints," so the guide is wrong. Besides the fact that being "known for her prints" doesn't mean Kollwitz was not also a sculptor, this answer choice just doesn't follow the stimulus's pattern of rejecting an assertion, identifying a positive fact, and then specifying the error in the assertion.
e
If this painting ██ █ ████████ ████ ██ ████████ ██ ██████ ██ ██ █████████ ██████████████ █████ ███████ █████ ███ █████████ ████ █████ ███ ██████ █████ █████ ██ ██ ██████████ █ █████████ ███ █████ ████ ███ ██ ████████
While the language in this answer choice parallels the language in the stimulus, it's important to see that this is actually a flawed argument, and follows a different pattern. Remember that the first sentence in the stimulus didn't leave us with any options. We had to conclude that the announcer's identification of the recording was incorrect, since it would be impossible for Louis Armstrong to play jazz after his death.
In this answer choice, the first sentence doesn't force us to any conclusions. It's possible that the painting is indeed a portrait done in acrylic, and so not by Vigée-Lebrun. Or it's possible that it is by Vigée-Lebrun, and not in acrylic. In other words, because no one is asserting any one of these claims, like the announcer was asserting that the recording was of Louis Armstrong in 1989, we don't have the same structure where we're forced to reject someone else's argument.
Similarly, instead of stating a fact that leaves us with one clear option for a conclusion, as the stimulus does, this answer choice gives us one fact — this painting is a portrait — and then assumes another one: it is by Vigée-Lebrun. This is the basis for concluding that the paint is not acrylic. This is a different structure from the stimulus.