Self-study
Rose: Support The book is either by Deerson or else by Jones; I’m not sure which. ████████ ███████████ █████ ███ █████████ █████████ ██ ██████ ██████ ██ ███ ██████████ ██████████ ███ ████ ██ ████████ █████████ ██ ███████
Abstract Summary
This argument features straightforward most reasoning with an extra “two options” layer sprinkled on top. Here’s the template for a simplified version of the argument featuring only the “most” layer:
Abstract
Most [objects] are [this way], so this [object] is probably [this way].
Stimulus
Most [Deerson books] are [published by Quince], so this [Deerson book] is probably [published by Quince].
The “two options” layer isn’t really that substantial – we’re just adding in a copy of the “most” claim with Deerson swapped out for Jones. So maybe the book is by Deerson and maybe it’s by Jones. Whatever. Either way it’s probably published by Quince. Here’s a template for the full argument:
Abstract
[An object] is [one of two options] – not sure which. Doesn’t matter though, because most [option 1 objects] are [this way] and most [option 2 objects] are also [this way]. So regardless, [the object] is probably [this way].
Stimulus
[This book] is [either by Deerson or Jones] – not sure which. Doesn’t matter though, because most [Deerson books] are [published by Quince] and most [Jones books] are also [published by Quince]. So regardless, [this book] is probably [published by Quince].
11.
The pattern of reasoning in █████ ███ ██ ███ █████████ ██ ████ ███████ ██ ████ ██ ████████ █████████
a
That tree is ██████ █ █████ ██ ████ ██ ████ ███ ████████ ███ ████████ ████ ██████ ██ ███ ████ ████████ ██ ████ ██ ████ █████ ██ ███
There are a few things wrong with (A), but I think “tell which it is” is the most obvious red flag on a shallow dip. The stimulus never tells us whether the book is by Deerson or Jones.
You could arguably notice a mismatch sooner than that, though. Here’s how we want (A) to look, with the mismatch bolded:
[That tree] is [either a beech or an elm] – not sure which. Doesn’t matter though, because most beeches are [blah] and most elms are [blah]...
b
The culprits escaped ██████ ██ ███ ██ ████ ██ █████ ███ ██ ██████ ████ ████ ████ ████ ██████ ███████████ ████████ █████ █████████ ███████ ████████ █████ █████
(B) should fail your shallow dip when its central claim says must instead of probably. Our right answer needs to involve a “most” (or “probably”) claim that applies to both options.
There’s also a logical gap between the gate creaking and Isidore hearing them that has no counterpart in the stimulus.
c
Judging by what ██ ████ ██ ███ ██████████ ██████ ██ ██████ █ ████ ██ ██████████ ███████ ████ █████ ██████████ ███ ██████████ ██ █ ███████ ██████████ █████████ ██████ ██████ ███ ██ █████ ██ █ ███████ ██████████
(C) should fail your shallow dip on the words are and should.
We need a “most” claim (or perhaps a “probably” claim) to apply to both options, but (C) gives us a certain claim instead.
(C)’s conclusion issues a value judgement – a normative claim about what we ought to do – whereas the stimulus’ argument is descriptive throughout.
d
Margarethe the Second ███ ████ ██████ ██ ████████████ ██ ████ ██ ███████████ ████ ██ ███ ██████ ██ ████ ████ ████ ████ ██ █████████ ████████ ██ ██████████ ████████ ███ █████████ ██████████
(D) is a part-for-part match. Check it out:
Abstract
[An object] is [one of two options] – not sure which. Doesn’t matter though, because most [option 1 objects] are [this way] and most [option 2 objects] are also [this way]. So regardless, [the object] is probably [this way].
(D)
[Marge] is [either Lupp or Kindel] – not sure which. Doesn’t matter though, because most [Lupps] are [Mondarian] and most [Kindels] are also [Mondarian]. So regardless, [Marge] is probably [Mondarian].
Notice how (D) uses different phrasing to describe the same concepts – e.g. “of Mondarian descent” vs. “had Mondarian ancestors” – that’s a common tactic the testwriters use to make right answer choices seem wrong.
e
Tomás will probably ███████████ ██ █████████ ████████ █████ ██ ████ ██████ ██████ ███████ ███████ ██ █████████ ██████████ ███ ██ ████ ████ ████████ █████████ ████████ ███ ████ ████ ███████████ ██ ████ ████ ██ █████████ ████████
(E) is a mismatch for present vs. future reasons (we’re predicting what Tomás will do based on what people currently do), and for fact vs. belief reasons (we’re basing our conclusion about what Tomás will do in fact based on what students say they do).
Both of these distinctions are common on the LSAT, and neither appears in the stimulus.