The United States Supreme Court’s 1948 ruling in . ███████ ██ ███████
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Which one of the following ██████████ ██ ████ ███████ █████████ ██ ███ ██████████ █████████
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The author never argues that other courts “should” refrain from appealing to Shelley v. Kraemer. Although the author does note that other courts have refrained from applying the rationale of the decision, this isn’t the same as a recommendation that courts shouldn’t rely on the decision.
If a private █████████ ██ ██████ ██████████ ██████████████ ███ ███████████ ███████ ██ ████ █████████ ██████ ██ ██████████ ███ █████████ ██ █ ████████
The author never argues that something in an agreement should be included in a statute. Although the author notes that the substance of an agreement might be illegal if it were part of a statute, that’s a separate issue from whether something in an agreement should be part of a statute.
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The author never argues that we should take measures to prevent racially restrictive covenants. Although it’s clear the author thinks racially restrictive covenants are undesirable, the author’s argument in the passage doesn’t involve a claim about what we should do about continuing practices of racially restrictive covenants.
If courts are ████████ ██ █████ ███ █████████ █████ ██ █ ████ █████████ ████ ██████ ██ █████ ██ ████████ ████ ███ █████████ ██ █████████████
This principle is used by the author at the end of P3. The author
If the rationale █████ ██ █ ████████ ████████ ██ █████ ██ ██ ██████████████ ███ ████████ ██████ ██ █████████ ██ ████████ █ ███ ██████████
The author never argues that the Court should offer a new rationale for the decision in Shelley. Although it’s clear the author does think that the Court, when it was deciding Shelley, should have used a different rationale, this isn’t the same as thinking that the Court should support the decision in Shelley with a new rationale now that people find its existing rationale controversial.