Historian: There is no direct evidence that timber was traded between the ancient nations of Poran and Nayal, but the fact that Support a law setting tariffs on timber imports from Poran was enacted during the third Nayalese dynasty does Conclusion suggest that during that period a timber trade was conducted.
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The historian argues that, though there isn't any direct evidence for a timber trade between Poran and Nayal, the fact that a law about timber imports from Poran was enacted in the third Nayalese dynasty indicates that those two nations did conduct a timber trade at that time.
The critic rejects the historian's argument, appealing to the fact that in today's legal system, many laws still remain on the books regulating activities that used to be common but are no longer performed.
Notice that the critic's response is an argument by analogy: since there are laws today that regulate activities that are no longer performed, by analogy (the critic argues), the Nayalese law might not be evidence that a timber trade was conducted in the period the historian identifies. But for an analogy to work, the situations actually have to be analogous — and these two situations are not.
The critic is talking about laws that have "remained" — i.e., that were enacted in the past, presumably when an activity was common, and are still on the books even though that activity is no longer performed. But the historian is talking specifically about the time period when the law was first enacted, arguing that if the Nayalese bothered to make a new law regulating timber imports from Poran, it seems likely that in that time period the two nations had a timber trade. So the critic's analogy doesn't actually apply to the historian's argument.
The critic’s response to the █████████████ █████████ ████ █████ ███ ██ ███ ██████████
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Incorrect. If you picked (C), you might have noticed that the critic does talk about something as if it were a possibility — specifically, that Nayal imported timber from Poran during the third dynasty — and then talk about something that is a certainty: "certainly," modern statute books contain laws regulating activities that people no longer engage in. So in that sense, the critic does talk in the abstract about a "possibility" and a "certainty."
But notice that the critic never claims that Nayal importing timber from Poran has been established as a possibility: in fact, the critic's whole point is to say that there is a lack of support for this possibility, and that the only evidence provided for this possibility (the tariff law) doesn't establish that possibility. In other words, if (C) were correct, the critic would be saying: "It's confirmed that it's at least possible for Nayal to have imported timber from Poran. But that's different from confirming something as a certainty, like how we know for sure that some laws today regulate activities people no longer perform." This would be a different argument from what we actually have.
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