Suffering from kidney failure and having fallen into a coma, Mr. █████ ████████ ████████ █ ██████ ███████████ ████ ███ █████████ ██████ ███████████ ██ ██████ █ ███████ ███ █████████ ████████ ███ ██ ██████ ███████ ██ ████ ███ ███████ ████ ██████████ ███ ███████████ ███ ████ ████ ███ ██████ ████████ ████████ ██ ███████████████ ██ ██████ ████ ████ ██████ ██ ███ ███████ ████ █████ ██████████ ██████ ███████ ██████████ ██ ███ █████ ██████ ████████ ███ ████ ███ ██████████ █████████ ███ █████ ██ █ ████████ ██████ █████ ███ ██████ ██ ██████ ███████ ███ ███████ ███ ██ ███████ ██ ███ ████████
When Mr. Smith was comatose and in need of a kidney transplant, his daughter decided not to consent to a kidney donation from Mr. Smith's cousin. This was because of Mr. Smith's moral objection to organ transplants from live donors due to the harm caused to the donor—even though Mr. Smith overestimated the risk to kidney donors.
We're looking to bridge the premise-to-conclusion gap in Mr. Smith's daughter's reasoning. She proceeds from Mr. Smith's moral objection to live organ donation, to conclude that she should not consent to such a donation on his behalf. The correct principle will logically lead from her premise to her conclusion.
Mr. Smith’s daughter’s decision conforms ██ █████ ███ ██ ███ █████████ ███████████
A son or █ ████████ ████ ██ ██████████ ████████ ██ ███████ ███ ████ ███ ██████ ██ █ ██████ ██████ ███ ██████ ███ ██████████ ███ ███ ██ ████████ ████ █████ ███
We learn about Mr. Smith's general moral objection to live organ donations, but as far as we know, he never actually prohibited his daughter from consenting to such a donation on his behalf. That means (A) would lead to the wrong conclusion: that Mr. Smith's daughter should have consented, to protect her father's life and health.
Anyone called on ██ ████ █ ███████ ████████ ██████████ ███████ ██████ ██████ ██████ █████ ███ █████████ ██ ████ ██████ ██ █████████ ███ ██████ █████████ ██ ████ █████ ████ ████ ███████ ████ ██████████ ███████ ██████████ ██ ████ ██████████ ████ ██████ ██████████ ██ ████████ █████████████
(B) leads to the wrong conclusion that Mr. Smith's daughter should have consented to the transplant. Doing so would have better promoted Mr. Smith's health, regardless of his moral beliefs.
A person has ██ ██████████ ██ ██████ █████████ █████████ ███████ ███ ██ ███████████ ████████ ██ ████ ███████ ██ ███ ██████ ██ ███████ ███ ████ ██ ███ ████████
We can reasonably assume that a kidney transplant is likely to prolong the life of someone in a coma due to kidney failure. That takes us outside of the realm where (C) applies—and since (C) isn't triggered by the stimulus, it's not the principle we need.
Withholding a medically █████████ █████████ ████ ██ ███████████ ███████ ██ █████████ ██ ████████ ████ █████████ █████ ██████ ██ ███████ ██████████ ████████ █████████ █████████
Mr. Smith's belief that live organ donors become disabled is false with regard to kidney donors; the transplant would not result in another person becoming disabled. That means (D) isn't triggered.
A patient’s rights ██ ██████████████████ ██████ ██ ██████████ ██ ██████ ██ ██████ ██ ███ ███████████ ███████████ ██████████ ██████████ ████ ████ █████ ███████████ ███ ████ ██ ████████ ████ █ ███████ █████████ ██ ███ ███████████ ████████████ ████████ ███ ████████
Mr. Smith has a general moral objection to live organ donation, allowing us (and his daughter) to infer a specific objection to his cousin donating a kidney. (E) tells us that his daughter thus has a moral obligation not to consent to such a transplant, which reflects her decision.