Self-study
Political advocate: Conclusion Campaigns for elective office should be subsidized with public funds. ███ ██████ ██ ████ ████ █████ █████ ███████████ ██ ██████ ████ ████ ██ █████████████ ████ ██████ ███████████ ██████████ ████ ████ ██ █████ ███ ███████ █ ██████ ██████ ██ ████ ████ █████████ █████ ████ ██ ████████ ██ ███ ████ ██ ██████████ ████████ ██████████████ ███████ ████████ ███ ██████████ ████ ███████ █████████ ████ ██ ███████ ███ ███ ███████ ███ ██ ███ ██████ ███ ██ ██████████ █████ █████████████
███████ ████ ████████ ██ ████████████ ███ ████ ███ ████ █████████ ██████████████ ███ ████ ████ ██████████ ████ ██ █████ ███████ ████ █████ █████████████
Stimulus Summary
The advocate proposes that campaigns for elective office should be subsidized with public funds. She offers two reasons in support of this proposal:
Reason 1: Public subsidies would allow politicians to devote less time to fund-raising, giving incumbents more time to serve the public.
Reason 2: Public subsidies would make it possible to set caps on individual campaign contributions, which would reduce the likelihood that elected officials are working for individual large contributors rather than the public.
So in the advocate's mind, public funding is a win-win. Politicians save time and they're less beholden to wealthy donors.
The critic pushes back. She points out that contribution caps would force candidates to spend more time chasing small donations. Think about what that means. Suppose a candidate used to receive one $1,000 donation from a single wealthy contributor. If a cap limits contributions to $100, that candidate now needs to find ten different people willing to give $100 each to raise the same amount. That takes a lot more time and effort.
This is a problem for the advocate's argument, because Reason 1 promises that public subsidies will save politicians time on fund-raising. But a direct consequence of Reason 2 (contribution caps) is that politicians would need to spend more time fund-raising. The two reasons are pulling in opposite directions.
Anticipation
Since the question asks us to describe the critic's objection, we want to understand what the critic is saying before going to the answer choices. The critic isn't saying that one of the advocate's reasons is wrong on its own. She's saying that the two reasons conflict with each other. Implementing caps (Reason 2) would create a side effect that works against the time-saving benefit promised by Reason 1. We're looking for an answer that captures this tension between the advocate's two reasons.
7.
The critic objects that the ████████████ ████████ ██ ██████ ███████
a
any resourceful large ███████████ ███ ██████████ ████ ██ ██████████ █████████████ ██ ███████ ██ ███████ ███████ █████ ███████ █████
The critic doesn't raise the possibility that large contributors might get around the caps by donating under different names. The critic's objection is specifically about the time candidates would need to spend finding small contributors when caps are in place. That's a different concern from whether large contributors can cheat the system.
b
one of the █████████ ███████ █████ ██ ███████ ██ ███ ████████ ████ ██ ████████ ██ ███ █████ ███ █████████ ████ ███ ██████████ ███████████ ███████ ██ ███ ████████
This might be a tempting answer because it seems to involve a relationship between the advocate's two reasons. But (B) says one projected result is entailed by the other, meaning one reason is just a logical consequence of the other and therefore redundant. That's not what the critic is saying. The critic isn't claiming that one reason must be true based on the other reason. The critic is claiming that one reason actively undermines the other. There's a big difference between saying "one reason logically follows from the other reason" and "one reason undermines the other."
c
of the two █████████ ███████ █████ ██ ███████ ██ ███ ████████ █████ ███ █████ ███████ ███ █████
This accurately describes the critic's objection. The advocate cites two projected results of public subsidies: (1) politicians will spend less time fund-raising, and (2) contribution caps will reduce the influence of large donors. The critic points out that implementing caps (the second result) would force candidates to spend more time seeking out small contributors, which directly works against the first result's promise of less time spent fund-raising. So one of the two projected results undermines the other.
d
it overlooks the ███████████ ████ █████ ████████████ ████ ████ ████████████ ██ ████ ██████ ██████████ ██ ████
The critic doesn't mention anything about large contributors deciding to stop contributing. The critic's concern is about the time candidates would need to spend finding small contributors, not about whether large contributors would exit the picture entirely.
e
it overlooks the ███████████ ████ ██████████ ████ █ ███ █████████ ████████ ████████████ ████ ██ ███ ██████ ██ ████ ████ ██████████ ████ ████ ██████████ ████████ ████████████
The critic doesn't distinguish between incumbents based on whether they have a few very generous contributors or many moderately generous contributors. The critic makes a general point about all candidates: contribution caps would force candidates to spend more time finding small contributors. There's no comparison between different types of incumbents in the critic's objection.