Support In many languages other than English there is a word for “mother’s brother” which is different from the word for “father’s brother,” whereas English uses the word “uncle” for both. █████ ████████ ██ █████ █████████ ████████ █ ████ ██████ █████████████ ███████ ██████ ████ ███████ ████████ ███ ███ ██████ ██ █████ █████ ███ ██████ ████ ██████ ██████ ████ ████████ ██ █████████ ██████████ ████████ ██ █████████ ████ ████ █████ █████ █████ ███ ██████ ████ ███████ ███ ████ ██ ████████████ ██████ ██ ███████████ ██ ████ ██████ ██ ████████ ██ ███████ ███ ████████████
The author concludes that people whose languages have fewer words for colors than does English must be less able to perceive different colors than are English-speakers. Why would this be the case? Because different languages have different numbers of words for colours. And in another situation where languages have different numbers of words—regarding kinship relationships—speakers of languages with more words pay more attention to the details of those relationships.
Fundamentally, the author is making a phenomenon-hypothesis argument: that the observed phenomenon of languages having different numbers of color words can be explained by the hypothesis that speakers of those languages are differently-able to distinguish colors. However, the argument's structure is complicated a little by the type of support the author uses. As evidence for this hypothesis, the author relies on an analogy between color words and kinship words, saying that because having more kinship words is attributable to a better perception of kinship, having more color words must also be attributable to a better perception of colors.
Because the argument uses both phenomenon-hypothesis reasoning and reasoning by analogy, we can use weakening strategies aimed at either of these types of reasoning. This means there are more possible directions for the correct answer, so it's important to keep an open mind and not accidentally eliminate a right answer that doesn't align with our predictions.
However, we can still brainstorm weakening possibilities. To attack the argument's phenomenon-hypothesis reasoning, we could present an alternative explanation, or evidence inconsistent with the hypothesis. To attack the analogy the author uses as support, we can show that kinship and color are not analogous categories to prevent the analogy from being relevant. And no matter how the correct answer weakens, remember that it will undermine the support between the premises and the conclusion.
The conclusion concerning words for ██████ █████ ██ ████████ █████ ██ █████ ███ ██ ███ █████████ ████ ████████
Most languages have ████████ █████ ███ ████████████ ███ ██████████████
Any claim about "most" languages will not be strong enough to guarantee the absolute conclusion of the argument. We don't need to know about most languages, we need to know that basic color words are linked to color perception in all languages.
Each language has █ █████████ █████ ████ ███ ████ ███████ ███████ ████ ███ ████████ ███ ████████████ ████████████
Let's apply (B) more directly to the argument. We're talking about color, which makes sense as a "sensory quality" that can be perceptually distinguished. So from (B) we can infer that each language has a different basic word for each color its speakers can distinguish. That's exactly the sufficient assumption we need—if basic color words are directly tied to color perception, then it must be true that speakers of languages with fewer color words are able to distiguish fewer colors than can English-speakers.
Every language makes ████ ████████ ████████████ ████ ██ █████ ████████ ██████
This is unrelated to color perception, so can't guarantee our conclusion. We don't know what category distinctions languages make or why. (C) leaves open the possibility that speakers of different languages can all see the same colors, but some just choose not to distinguish them with different words.
In any language ██████ ██████████ ████ █████ ███████ ██████████ ████ ███ █████████ ███ ███ ████████ ██ ███████████ ████████████ ████ ████ ██████
(D) talks about perceptual distinctions, but it goes in the wrong direction of talking about importance. It doesn't matter to us how important color distinctions are in different languages, but whether speakers of different languages can see those colors at all. (D) doesn't guarantee that speakers of languages without certain color words can't see those colors.
Speakers of languages ████ ██████████ ███ █████ █████ ███ ██████ ████ ██ ████████████ ███████ █████ █████ ███ █████ ██ ███ ████ ███████ ██ ██████
(E) provides an explanation for why languages might have few color words. What it doesn't do it link that explanation to people's ability to see different colors. (E) leaves open the possibility that speakers of some languages can see various colors, they just don't have words for them because it's not useful. And that means (E) doesn't guarantee our conclusion.