Political advocate: Conclusion Campaigns for elective office should be subsidized with public funds. ███ ██████ ██ ████ ████ █████ █████ ███████████ ██ ██████ ████ ████ ██ █████████████ ████ ██████ ███████████ ██████████ ████ ████ ██ █████ ███ ███████ █ ██████ ██████ ██ ████ ████ █████████ █████ ████ ██ ████████ ██ ███ ████ ██ ██████████ ████████ ██████████████ ███████ ████████ ███ ██████████ ████ ███████ █████████ ████ ██ ███████ ███ ███ ███████ ███ ██ ███ ██████ ███ ██ ██████████ █████ █████████████
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The advocate proposes that campaigns for elective office should be subsidized with public funds. She offers two reasons in support of this proposal:
Reason 1: Public subsidies would allow politicians to devote less time to fund-raising, giving incumbents more time to serve the public.
Reason 2: Public subsidies would make it possible to set caps on individual campaign contributions, which would reduce the likelihood that elected officials are working for individual large contributors rather than the public.
So in the advocate's mind, public funding is a win-win. Politicians save time and they're less beholden to wealthy donors.
The critic pushes back. She points out that contribution caps would force candidates to spend more time chasing small donations. Think about what that means. Suppose a candidate used to receive one $1,000 donation from a single wealthy contributor. If a cap limits contributions to $100, that candidate now needs to find ten different people willing to give $100 each to raise the same amount. That takes a lot more time and effort.
This is a problem for the advocate's argument, because Reason 1 promises that public subsidies will save politicians time on fund-raising. But a direct consequence of Reason 2 (contribution caps) is that politicians would need to spend more time fund-raising. The two reasons are pulling in opposite directions.
Which one of the following ███████████ ██ ████████████ ████████ █ █████ ███ ███ ████████████ █████████
If complete reliance ██ ███████ ███████ ██ ████ ████████ █████ ███ ██████ ████ ████████ █ ███████ ████ █████ ██ ████████ ██ ██████ █████ ████ █████ ████ ██████ █████ ██████ ██ █████████
This strengthens the argument. (A) says: if relying only on private money keeps the public from a benefit that public money could provide, then the public money should be provided. We know from the premises that campaigns today run only on private money. Because of that, the public misses out on two benefits: incumbents who have more time to serve, and officials who work for the public instead of for big contributors. Public funding would provide both. So (A)'s rule applies here, and leads to the conclusion that we should provide the public funds.
If election campaigns ███ ██ ██ ██████ ████ ██████ ██████ █████ ██ ██████ ███ ███████ █████████ ██████ ██ ███████████
This treats public funding as already decided and attaches a new demand to it. A principle that tells you what should happen once campaigns are publicly funded gives no reason to start funding them publicly, which is the conclusion we're trying to reach.
If in an ████████ ████████ █████ █████████████ ████ █████████ ██ ███ ██████████ ██████ █████ ██████ ██ ████ ██ ███████ ███ █████████ ██ ████ █████████████ ███████
This applies to a situation the advocate never talks about. (C) is about a single race where one candidate is collecting most of the big money. In that case, (C) says public funds should go to that candidate's rivals. The advocate isn't talking about lopsided races. The proposal is to subsidize campaigns across the board. The advocate's worry about large contributors is different too. The worry is that officials end up serving those contributors after the election, not that one candidate raises more than another.
If public funding ██ ████ ████████ ████████ █ ███████ ██ ███ ██████ ███ ████ ██████████ █ ███████ ███████ ███ ████████ ████████████ ███ ████████ ██████ ███ ██ █████ ██████ ████████ ███ ██ ████ ██ ███ ███████████ ████████ ███ ███████ ████████
This works against the advocate, if it applies at all. (D) says that when public funding helps the public but also gives a special benefit to certain individuals, those individuals should pay part of the cost themselves. In other words, don't fund the activity entirely with public money. That is a limit on public funding, not a reason to provide public funding.
If a person █████ ███ ████ ███ ███ ██████ ██ ███ ███████ ██ ██████ ████████ ██████████ ████ ██████ ██████ ███ ██ ████████ ███ ███ ████ ██████████
This only tells us who should be denied subsidies. A rule about who is ineligible for a program assumes the program exists; it gives no reason to create a subsidy program, and creating one is what the advocate is arguing for. Also, nothing in the stimulus mentions anyone who would not have run for office without subsidies, so the principle in (E) would never trigger.