Support Doctors in Britain have long suspected that patients who wear tinted eyeglasses are abnormally prone to depression and hypochondria. █████████████ █████ █████ █████ ██ ████████ ████████ ████████ ███ ████████ ██████████ ████ █████ ████ ███ █████████ ████████ █████████ ████ █ █████████████ ███████ ██████ █████ ████████████ ██ ███ █████ ██ ███████████████ ███████ ██████ ████ ███████ ██ ██████ ██████ ████████████ █████ ██ █████████ ██ ███████████ ██ ███ █████ ██ ███ ██ █████████ ████ ████ ████ ███████ ███ █████ ██ ██ ███████ ███ ██████ ███ █ ████████ ██ ██ █████████ ██ ████████████████
This stimulus serves both Q22 and Q23. Both address the argument's gaps, but the fact that Q23 is a "Weaken EXCEPT" question indicates that this stimulus features a ton of flaws – the testwriters need room for 4 wrong answers that each make a legitimate attack on the argument. In hindsight, it turns out the main themes that govern the answer choices are causation and overgeneralization:
Premise: [Sunglass-wearers in British hospitals who were admitted for physical complaints like heart pain] are more likely to be depressed / hypochondriacal.
________
Conclusion: Sunglass-wearing across time and space is always caused by depression / hypochondria.
Spotting the correlation =/= causation angle of attack is straightforward. This argument fits the classic phenomenon hypothesis pattern, drawing a specific causal conclusion from data that’s merely correlative.
But we can also attack the stimulus from an overgeneralization perspective – it takes data that shows a correlation within a ridiculously narrow scope (sunglass-wearers in British hospitals who were admitted for physical complaints like heart pain) and makes an absurdly strong categorical claim about all the sunglass-wearers in the universe.
The argument assumes which one ██ ███ ██████████
Depression is not ██████ ██ ████ █████ ██ ██ ███████ █████████ ██ ███ █████
According to the author, depression causes people to wear sunglasses. When negated, (A) simply suggests another link in that causal chain: some organic condition causes depression, which in turn causes people to wear sunglasses. That's totally fine.
Wearers do not █████ ██ ███ ██████ ███████ ██ █ █████ ██ ██████████ ██████████ ████ █████ ███████
The argument suggests one reason depressed people might wear tinted glasses (to reduce visual stimulation), but it never asserts that's the only reason. (B), when negated, simply says "maybe there's this other reason too," which is totally fine.
Depression can have ████ ███████ █████████ ██████ ██████████ █████ █████ ██ ██ ██████████ ███ ██████ ██ ██ ██████████
(C) is about the various causes of depression (or the lack thereof), but the argument's point is that depression itself is a cause (of sunglass-wearing). So (C)'s impact addresses a different link in the causal chain: [something] causes depression, which in turn causes sunglass-wearing.
For hypochondriacs wearing ██████ ████████ ███ ███████ █████ ██ █ ██████ ██████ ██ ██████ ████ ███ ██████████ ██████ ██ █████████
The argument doesn't need to assume sunglasses send this particular social signal. (D) also doesn't help (or hurt) when assumed, because it doesn't address the link between depression and sunglass-wearing.
The tinting does ███ ███ █████ ██ ███ ███ ██████ ██ ███████ ███ ██████████ ████ ██████████████
When negated, (E) threatens to reverse the direction of causality from the argument's conclusion: it's not that depression causes people to wear sunglasses, it's that sunglasses make people depressed.
The argument assumes the causal relationship doesn't run the other way.