PT12.S2.Q21

SECTION 1 · lr

Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5 Question 6 Question 7 Question 8 Question 9 Question 10 Question 11 Question 12 Question 13 Question 14 Question 15 Question 16 Question 17 Question 18 Question 19 Question 20 Question 21 Question 22 Question 23 Question 24 Question 25 Question 26

SECTION 2 · lr

Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5 Question 6 Question 7 Question 8 Question 9 Question 10 Question 11 Question 12 Question 13 Question 14 Question 15 Question 16 Question 17 Question 18 Question 19 Question 20 Question 21 Question 22 Question 23 Question 24 Question 25

SECTION 3 · rc

PASSAGE 1

Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5 Question 6 Question 7

PASSAGE 2

Question 8 Question 9 Question 10 Question 11 Question 12 Question 13

PASSAGE 3

Question 14 Question 15 Question 16 Question 17 Question 18 Question 19 Question 20

PASSAGE 4

Question 21 Question 22 Question 23 Question 24 Question 25 Question 26 Question 27

SECTION 4 · lr

Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5 Question 6 Question 7 Question 8 Question 9 Question 10 Question 11 Question 12 Question 13 Question 14 Question 15 Question 16 Question 17 Question 18 Question 19 Question 20 Question 21 Question 22 Question 23 Question 24

The naturalist concludes that we have an obligation to save the South Island tuatara from extinction, even though there was previously no need to do so. This is supported by a new understanding that South Island tuatara are a distinct species. That means if South Island tuatara are wiped out, an entire species will go extinct. Before, it was thought that South Island tuatara were the same species as North Island tuatara; losing the South Island population wouldn't have been a problem if the species survived on North Island.

When looking for the correct principle, we'll need something to bridge the gap between the naturalist's premises and conclusion. And that gap is the value judgment the naturalist makes: why is it important to save the South Island tuatara if it's a distinct species, but not if it's the same species as the North Island tuatara?

We can phrase a justifying principle as a statement triggered by the naturalist's premises and leading to the naturalist's conclusion. For example, if and only if an animal population represents an entire species, then we have an obligation to protect that population. We could also break this into two statements: if an animal population represents an entire species, then we have an obligation to protect that population; if an animal population does not represent an entire species, then we have no obligation to protect that population.