Support If that insect is a bee, it can only sting once. ██ ████ ███ █████ █████ ██ ██ ██ █ ████
The argument concludes that a particular insect is a bee. How do we know? Because if the insect were a bee, it would only be able to sting once. And in fact, the insect only stung once.
You may recognize this classic flaw: the argument affirms the necessary condition, a form of sufficient-necessary confusion. The argument says that stinging once is a necessary condition. However, it then affirms that necessary condition, and goes on to conclude that the sufficient condition (of being a bee) is also affirmed.
We want to find a parallel argument. Even though the question stem fails to specify, we know we're looking for a parallel flawed argument, because the argument in the stimulus is flawed. To parallel the stimulus, we're looking for another argument that confuses sufficiency and necessity by affirming the necessary condition.
Which one of the following ████████ █ ███████ ██ █████████ ████ ███████ ██ ████ ██ ███ ████████ ██████
Spring is here. ██ ███ ██ ███ ███████ ████ ██ ██ ███████ █ ██████ ████ █████████ ███ █ ████ ████████
Like the stimulus, (A) proceeds by affirming the necessary condition, making it our parallel (flawed) argument. The speaker in (A) states that if it's spring, then they can't stop sneezing—sneezing is the necessary condition. But the speaker affirms this condition in order to conclude that the sufficient condition of it being spring is also true.
When the sky ██ ██████ ███ ███████████ ████████ ██ █████ ██ ███ ███████ ██ ██ ████████ ███ ██ ███ ███████████ ████████ ██ █████ ██ ██ ████ █████
(B) doesn't follow the same form as the stimulus. Both state a general condition—for (B), that's the claim that if the sky is clear, then atmospheric pressure is high. But (B) properly affirms that the sufficient condition will soon be true, allowing the conclusion to properly follow.
Old and brittle █████████ ███ ██████ █████ ████ ███████ █████ ████ ██████████ ████████ ██ █████ █████ ████ ███████ █████ ██ ██ ████ ███ ██ ███ ███ ████████
Like the stimulus, (C) gives us a conditional principle: that if a painting is old and brittle, it is always moved with extreme care. But where the stimulus affirms the necessary condition, (C) denies the necessary condition. This is a valid form of argument, enabling a proper conclusion.
Only one more ████████████ ███ ██████ ██ ████ ████ █████ ███ ███ ████ ███ █████ ████ █ █████ ██████ █████ ████ ███ ████ ████ ███ █████████████ ████ ████ ██████
(D) is a lot like (C). It gives us a condition: if there were one more thunderstorm, then the roof would be ruined. It then denies the necessary condition of this principle: the roof was not ruined. This allows (D) to validly conclude that the sufficient condition isn't true. This pattern of reasoning doesn't match the stimulus, which invalidly affirms the necessary condition.
To survive in ███ ████ ████████ ████████ ███████ ████ █████████ ███ ███ █████ ████████ ████ ██ ███████ █████ ███████ ███ █████████
Rather than a straightforward condition-fact-conclusion structure (E) gives us two necessary conditions for surviving in the wild: physical stamina, and not being scared of spiders. This already diverges from the stimulus, which only features a single conditional relationship.
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