Self-study
P1
In an experiment, two strangers are given the opportunity to share $100, subject to the following constraints: One person—the "proposer"—is to suggest how to divide the money and can make only one such proposal. ███ █████ ████████████ ██████████████ ████ ██████ ██████ ██ ██████ ███ █████ ███████ ██████████████ ████ ███████ ████ ████ ██ ███ █████ ██ █████████ ███ █████ ████ ██ █████ ██ ███████ ███ ██ ███ █████ ██ █████████ ███████ ████ ███████ █████████
Experiment ·
The Ultimatum Game
Two players can split $100. One player proposes how to split. The other player decides to accept or reject. If accept, the split is as proposed. If reject, both parties get nothing.
P2
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Results ·
Many offer to split 50/50 because it's "fair"
Results ·
Most offer to split a bit less than 50/50
Presumably the proposer thinks this is still within the realm of "fair." I get 60, you get 40. Still fair, right?
Results / Puzzling Phenomenon ·
A few offer less than 20% and most responders reject that offer
But why would they reject? Even if the offer is low, accepting means getting something (e.g., $20) whereas rejecting means getting nothing.
P3
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Hypothesis ·
In-group support
The offer of a fair division is based on our ancestor's need for the support of a strong small group and so we want to treat each other fairly.
Critique ·
But this explains the wrong phenomenon.
We're not trying to explain the "fair" or "fair-ish" offers. We're trying to explain the "unfair" rejections.
P4
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Explanation ·
Our emotions are not evolved for one-time anonymous interations
Not sure what this means but will keep reading.
Explanation Details ·
Our emotions are evolved for repeated public interactions
We have a reputation to maintain. If we accept an "unfair" offer, then we are advertising to our social group that we can be treated unfairly. Hence, we instinctively reject such offers. Even though in the instance of the experiment, rejecting makes no sense and is actually to our detriment.
Passage Style
Critique or debate
Phenomenon-hypothesis (RC)
23.
Which one of the following ████ ██████████ ██████████ ███ ████ ████ ██ ███ ████████
a
Contrary to a ███████████ ██████████ ██ ███████████ ██████████ ███ ████████ ██ ████████████ ██ ███ █████████ ████ ████████████ ████ ██████ ██ ███ ████ ████████ █████████ ███ ██ ████████ ██████████████
This doesn’t capture the author’s belief that the results of the Ultimatum Game can be explained by the fact our emotions have been shaped by living in small groups. (A) is also not supported, because the Ultimatum Game involves only one example of a behavior that doesn’t seem to fit rational self-interest. This doesn’t establish that people do not make economic decisions out of rational self-interest. They could generally make such decisions out of self-interest, but with a few exceptions such as those decisions observed in the Ultimatum Game.
b
Although the reactions ████ ████████ █████████ ██ ████████████ ██ ███ █████████ ████ ██████ ██ ████████ ████ ████████ ██████████████ ████ ████████ ██████ ████ █ ██████████████ ████ ███ ████████████ ██████
This is the best answer. It’s the only answer that captures the author’s belief that the results of the Ultimatum Game
c
Because our emotional █████████ ███ ████ ██████ ██ ████████ ██ █████ ██ ██████ ██ █████ ██████ ██ █████ ██ ██ ████ ██ ████ ████████ ███ ████████ ███ ███ ██████ █████ ██ █████████ █████████ █████████████
This is part of the support offered for the author’s hypothesis that the results of the Ultimatum Game can be explained by the way we evolved. Although (C) is supported, it’s too narrow to be the main point.
d
People respond emotionally ██ ███ ██████ ██ ███ █████████ ████ ███████ ████ █████████████ ████ ███ ████ ██ ████████ ███ ████████ ██ ███ ██████ █████ ██ █████ ████ ███████
This is the hypothesis in P3 that the author doubts. The author offers a different, “more compelling” explanation in P4. So the hypothesis from P3 can’t be the main point.
e
When certain social ███ ████████████ ███████ ███ █████ ████ ████████ ██ ███ ██ ████ ████ ███ ████████ ██ ████████████ ██ ███ █████████ ████ ██ █████████ █████████ ██ ███ ████ ██ ██████████ ███████
The author never suggests that the results of the Ultimatum Game are explained by a need to outcompete rivals. The idea of outcompeting one’s rivals relates to P3. But the hypothesis the author finds more compelling is in P4, and that hypothesis doesn’t involve the idea of outcompeting rivals.