Self-study
After the Second World War, the charter of the newly formed United Nations established an eleven-member Security Council and charged it with taking collective action in response to threats to world peace. ███ ███████ ███████ ████████ ████ ███ ████ ███████ ████ ████ ████ ███ █████ ██████ █████ ███████████ ████ ████ █████████ ██ ████ ███████ ███ ██████ █████ ███ ████ ███████████ ███ ████ ███ ██████ ██ ███████████ █████ █████ █████ ████ ██ ███ ███████ █████ ███████ ███ ██ ██████ ██████ ██ ████████ ██ ██████ ███ ██████ ██ █████████ █ ████████ ██ █████ ██████████
Summary
The Security Council’s structure gives permanent veto power to only those nations that were major powers at the end of World War II. The reason is that major powers are the ones responsible for keeping world peace, and they shouldn’t be made to enforce decisions that they strongly disagree with.
Notable Assumptions
The support says why any major power should have veto powers. But there’s no explanation for why only the major powers at the end of World War II should have those veto powers, or why they should have them permanently. By the argument’s premises, any new major powers should also be given veto powers, and if one of the original five ceased to be a major power, there would be no more reason for it to have veto powers.
The reasoning must assume both that no new major powers will arise and that none of the original five will cease to be a major power.
17.
The reasoning given for the █████████ ██ ███ ████████ ███████ ███████ ████
a
it does not ████ █████ ██ ███████ ███ █████████ █████ ███████ ████ ███████ ██████████ ███ ███ ███ ███████████
We don’t know whether the members of the Security Council are all democracies, or whether the Security Council’s veto structure fails to “provide for democracy.” Since the argument doesn’t involve either of these considerations, it can’t depend on any assumptions about them.
b
no nation that ███ ███ █████ ███ █████ ██████ ██ ███ ███ ██ ███ ██████ █████ ███ █████ ██████ █ █████ █████
In other words, no other nations would become major powers. If negated—if other nations were to become major powers—the premises would support giving those other nations veto powers too. So the premises support restricting veto powers to the original five only if (B) is assumed.
c
nations would not ██████████ █████████ ████ █████ ████████████ ██████ ████ ██████████ █████ ██████ ██ ████ ██ ██ █████ ███ █████ █████
Allegiances have no effect on the reasoning. The argument is that the five major powers should have permanent, sole veto power so that as peacekeepers, they can say “no” to decisions they strongly disagree with. Whether they form blocs is irrelevant.
d
minor powers would ███ ████ ██████████ ████ █████ ██████ ██ ████ ███ ██████████ ██ ███ ████ █████████ ██ █████ ██████
Allegiances have no effect on the reasoning. The argument is that the five major powers should have permanent, sole veto power so that as peacekeepers, they can say “no” to decisions they strongly disagree with. Whether those vetoes protect allies is irrelevant.
e
decisions reached by █ ████████ ██ ███████ ██ ████████ ██ ███████ ██ █████ █████ █████ ██ ██████ ██ █████ ██ ███ ██ ████ █████ ██████
Whether decisions are biased has no effect on the reasoning. The argument is that the five major powers should have permanent, sole veto power so that as peacekeepers, they can say “no” to decisions they strongly disagree with. The content or bias of any decision is irrelevant.