Background: The five senses have traditionally been viewed as distinct yet complementary. Each sense is thought to have its own range of stimuli that are incapable of stimulating the other senses.

Support: Recent research has discovered that some people taste a banana and claim that they are tasting blue, or see a color and say that it has a specific smell.

Conclusion: This shows that such people, called synesthesiacs, have senses that do not respect the usual boundaries between the five recognized senses.

Pre-phrase: We appear to be concluding something definitive ("this shows") based on what people are perceiving or saying. How do we know for sure?

A, correct: This is a bit much to parse, but if this is true, and they are unreliable in their descriptions, then maybe they aren't actually tasting blue. Then we can't conclude anything for sure.

B: That's great, but this is an aside. Our argument is localized to whether or not the synesthesiacs conform to what we know about these five senses. If anything, if there were more senses, that would strengthen the argument.

C: They can follow a definite pattern and still not respect the usual boundaries. So this is in alignment with the argument.

D: This is a descriptive fact and doesn't do anything to our argument.

E: Even if they could be temporarily rid of these experiences, they could still be valid, and still challenge what we know about the five senses, so this doesn't necessarily weaken unless we interpret it in a specific way.

Support: It is better if everyone who drinks the office’s coffee provides the same amount of support to the fund. (...Although some coffee drinkers would prefer to pay for their coffee by the cup, or in some other manner).

Conclusion: All coffee drinkers in an office ought to contribute equally to the fund that pays for the office’s coffee.

A, correct: The author's argument, in sum, is "We should do X, because X is better than other ways (Y, Z, etc)." We can reason that saying "this is the better way" is synonymous with saying "this is the way it should be done." Circular reasoning.

B: It doesn't matter if the author overlooks this, since the author's argument is about this specific circumstance. If anything, the author does the opposite, generalizing from what is overall "better" (most? conditions) to this office ("specified" conditions).

C: This doesn't occur.

D: There's no judging of individuals involved, and there are alternatives that are different discussed, not two groups doing the same thing. The author doesn't talk about anyone as an exception to the rule.

E: The author does not present us two alternatives -- the author says "would prefer Y, or Z," for one. Further, this would indicate a false dichotomy flaw, like if the author said, "We can either pay the same amount or pay by cup. We shouldn't pay by cup. So we should pay the same amount," without considering that those weren't the only choices. I think of the question about authoritarian governments as an example of that flaw.

@jujujube Thanks!

You too!! Thanks for this!

@elinaaa Thank you!

I had this issue too and did all of the very old material (which honestly I think is really helpful because it's pretty tough) and then have been doing as Marcus also commented and just going by what I did least recently. You can't filter by that but I filter by recent and then scroll all the way down, lol

good luck!

We got this bro!

@Stas1973 Ahh, I see! I was getting confused by how the mechanism for (D) -- introducing a premise on the leftmost side of the chain -- can be beneficial for many SA q's. The way you took the contrapositives also makes it make a lot more sense. I see that even in this form:

(D) would give us: /H --> /UGSR

We implicitly have: /H --> /AT

Conclusion is /UGSR --> /AT

So even in this instance... Adding /H --> /UGSR --> /AT doesn't really tell us anything new. It would be more helpful to affirm "/H --> /AT" as definitely true in addition to bridging /UGSR --> /H.

Whereas (A): /UGSR --> /H

/H --> /AT

/UGSR --> /AT

This actually helps the chain make sense:

/UGSR --> /H --> /AT

Carrillo: Our statistical model (which used # of existing + measures of genetic diversity) supports that the first primate developed ~81.5 mil years ago.

Olson: The oldest primate fossils discovered (different method) date back only 55 mil years, your estimate is speculative.

A: Carrillo agrees with this. Olson mentions the oldest fossils found. At first I thought we can't conclude definitively that Olson thinks they've been around for more than 55. HOWEVER, since Olson says the fossil is 55 million years old (so when the primate died?) the primate would have had to be alive or first born way before 55 million, so he may agree primates have been around for more than 55 million. Either way, he doesn't disagree, so not (A).

B, correct: Carrillo thinks his model is a reliable way from saying that it supports facts. Olson is stating that it produces a speculative estimate, so presumably he doesn't think that it is reliable and conclusive / he says that other evidence should be weighed instead.

C: Neither of them comment on the "available sample" of primate fossils. Olson brings up the oldest ones only, and Carrillo doesn't mention this at all.

D: Carrillo doesn't have an opinion here, whereas intuitively Olson would believe that this citation is accurate since he invokes it.

E: Neither of them mention the first primate species.

Facts: Philosophical paradoxes are baffling. Our intuitions tell us one thing but also another thing (that are presumably incompatible). To solve a philosophical paradox, we must accept any one of three things (conclusion true, 1+ premises /true, or premises do not grant conclusion).

A, correct: By telling us that it requires us to accept some things that seem to go against at least one of our intuitions ("intuitively seems to be incorrect"), we can deduce that in order to solve, we must ignore some of our intuitions. The three things mentioned also go against the intuitions outlined -- Intuitions say conclusion false: we may have to accept conclusion true. Intuitions say conclusion follows logically from true premises: we may have to accept not all premises true, or conclusion does not follow logically.

B: We have nothing that tells us premises true -> conclusion true. We don't have to accept that the conclusion is true, it's just one of the ways to solve it.

C: We don't know anything about multiple premises vs. less.

D: We don't know anything about different people problem-solving.

E: We can solve it by other mechanisms. We don't have to accept that the conclusion is true, it's just one of the ways to solve it.

Sometimes makes me anxious, lol

Facts: If highly successful entrepreneur --> have main desire to leave a mark.

If highly successful entrepreneur --> implement ideas when see solutions.

But they are unique in this. So nobody else does this. So, bi-conditional: If seeing a solution and implementing --> highly successful entrepreneur.

/Highly successful entrepreneur --> /implement ideas when see solutions (some of the time)

A: We don't know whether most people want to leave a mark on the world or not.

B: We don't know whether this group or people cares for leisure.

C: We know the highly successful people have the desire to leave a mark; we know they are the ones who implement solutions when they see them, so we know they are the ones whose main desire to leave a mark. Seeing + implementing --> Highly successful --> Main desire leave mark.

D: We don't know whether this group or people cares for leisure, or how much. We'd need to be assuming too much to make (D) work.

E: We know their desire is to leave a mark, we don't know that they accomplish this. This further gets it wrong by saying their desire is to implement solutions, and we don't know anything about that potential group of people.

@Stas1973 Hi! Do you think D would work here if it was a SA question?

@AgnesAlojado Thanks!

@Kevin_Lin Hi! I am wondering how it works?

@Stas1973 Thank you so much!

@Stas1973 Hi! I'm wondering if you have advice for a correct reading of AC (A). I incorrectly mapped it on as: Using a statement about the consequences of actions ("if everyone walked across the grass, the grass would die") to disprove a statement about the actions themselves (disprove that walking across the grass doesn't hurt it?), so I thought that this was happening.

I see that (B) applies a lot better to the way Sid responds to Micki's argument, but is a correct reading of (A) more so like, a statement about consequences of actions ("if everyone walked across the grass, the grass would die") to disprove a statement about the actions themselves ("walking across grass...is not a bad thing")?

Summary: Faden: Our customer survey shows people still use our machines. Yay! // Greenwall: But what if they're horrible, lazy, liars? They aren't actually using our machines. // Faden: You can't prove they're lying. So your response to me is totally bogus.

Issues: Greenwall's objection is still valid, even if he doesn't have definite proof. He's just bringing up a potential issue. In theory, that possibility would hurt Faden's argument.

A: Greenwall doesn't take this for granted. He said many could be lying, he isn't saying that this is a sure thing.

B: Greenwall doesn't make any presumptions about most people. Being "dishonest about their personal habits" also goes beyond the scope of this argument.

C: If anything, Faden is doing the opposite here, thinking that because there isn't conclusive evidence for Greenwall's statement, then it isn't believable.

D: Faden does say, because you can't prove the survey evidence false here, you aren't undermining that claim ("your objection is absurd"). But Greenwall could still be undermining the claim without proving the survey to be definitely illegitimate.

/Proven false --> /Undermined; to undermine --> must prove evidence false. Faden thinks you must prove false to undermine, but Greenwall is undermining anyhow.

E: Greenwall doesn't take this for granted. He said many could be lying, he isn't saying that this applies to everybody or most people. This leaves room for (E) to be true.

Did anyone else take issue with how it said significant demand? #help

Background/laying out opinion: Advertising agencies are often wrongly criticized for causing people to desire, and thus purchase, products they do not really need.

Support: People actually buy what they buy mainly because they believe the product will satisfy their desires—a belief that, admittedly, it is the purpose of advertising agencies to induce.

Conclusion: It is clear then, that the desires that people believe products will satisfy ___.

Pre-phrase: Ok, it seems the author is getting us to the point that advertisers don't cause the desires and the purchases. People already have desires, and advertisers just convince them that those desires will be satisfied with their products. So.... the desires are their own, but the tale they are told is by the advertisers.

A: Can be classified as needs? I don't think we know what would allow that to be true.

B: The stimulus doesn't talk about false advertising claims, just whether desires and needs are legitimate or not.

C: We don't know whether they'll be satisfied or not. If anything, our author here seems pretty pro-advertisers, saying they are "wrongly criticized" for causing people to purchase products they don't need.

D: Correct. This covers everything we have been told. The desires are an individuals' own, not created by advertisers, but advertisers respond to them to induce the belief in satisfaction (exploit them).

E: It's not just that the desires get them to make purchases ("to believe claims" is fishy here), but the way advertisers respond to their desires (we are told that they have to induce the belief in the satisfaction of the desire).

I'm not sure if anyone else was between (A) and (E), but something that helped me was realizing that for (E) to be correct, we'd need to know (A) first -- knowing that there are less mites doesn't help us answer any questions about why they care about cool areas. If we know (A), that they need the environment to be cooler in order to be located there, then (E) makes more sense, that they moved away to gravitate to the colder regions, but otherwise on its own (E) does not complete what we have because it doesn't introduce reconciliatory / important information.

This is so awesome and nice of you guys. Keeping my eyes peeled for the next!

@Stas1973 Similar to the question we discussed the other day!

General gist: governments should ban all instances of an ad that promote X, which has been shown to be bad for one's health.

Pre-phrase: Looking for a principle that says something of the sort, "If X is a health hazard, governments should be allowed to ban them from being shown in advertisements." If bad for health --> Shouldn't be in ad; to be in an ad --> must not be a health hazard.

A. There could be loopholes here. People don't have to be smoking for the ad to promote smoking. Reasonably the ad could still promote smoking then. This also says, Ad --> /show unhealthful, if shows unhealthful --> /Ad? Just not a chain that we can follow properly for what the stimulus concludes.

B. This argument doesn't concern making misleading claims about healthfulness.

C. The argument is saying the ads should be banned. This doesn't address our argument.

D. The argument is saying the ads should be banned. This doesn't address our argument.

E, correct. This principle, for ad to promote --> must be healthful, follows the stimulus.

Let me know your thoughts about my explanations/thinking here!

@Stas1973 Same here :). And got it -- it seems going forward on questions like these we can base our understanding of if that applies on the surrounding context. I'm thinking of a parallel flaw Q that plays on this but forgetting the # -- but I will hunt for similar questions. Thanks so much!