(E) boils down to calling social science laws not scientific laws. How can that be? To emphasize it again, they are the social sciences after all. Moreover, just b/c social sciences don't uphold 2 pillars of what scientific laws doesn't mean they're never scientific by nature.
The STIM is prescriptive: If a scientific law should display some property, that doesn't necessarily mean its absence disqualifies it as a scientific law. Perhaps whomever formulated these rules just likes SCI L to be this way but may also acknowledge that a law might be sub-par if it doesn't have these properties, yet still be "scientific."
I think that's why the word ideally also functions very importantly here: the speaker is telling us things that should transpire under perfect conditions. And what if they're not? We simply don't know.
(A) understands the prescriptive nature and just says something is to be preferred. We have no idea from the STIM what else SCI L should display or are required to display, so knowing that "all else" is held = combined with what properties ought to be minimally present allows us to draw an inference with the appropriate boundaries.
Here's another example:
Ideally, fleshy fruits should be mildly tender and blemish-free when eaten to be considered delicious. So I've got this peach that's somewhat more firm than tender, and there're a few specks on its flesh.
Can I say it can't ever be considered delicious? That's going too far.
But if it's a choice between a mildly tender and blemish-free plum and this peach, & all else is the same, under my own stated preferences, the plum is to be preferred if I'm looking for a delicious fruit.
Comments
(E) boils down to calling social science laws not scientific laws. How can that be? To emphasize it again, they are the social sciences after all. Moreover, just b/c social sciences don't uphold 2 pillars of what scientific laws doesn't mean they're never scientific by nature.
The STIM is prescriptive: If a scientific law should display some property, that doesn't necessarily mean its absence disqualifies it as a scientific law. Perhaps whomever formulated these rules just likes SCI L to be this way but may also acknowledge that a law might be sub-par if it doesn't have these properties, yet still be "scientific."
I think that's why the word ideally also functions very importantly here: the speaker is telling us things that should transpire under perfect conditions. And what if they're not? We simply don't know.
(A) understands the prescriptive nature and just says something is to be preferred. We have no idea from the STIM what else SCI L should display or are required to display, so knowing that "all else" is held = combined with what properties ought to be minimally present allows us to draw an inference with the appropriate boundaries.
Here's another example:
Ideally, fleshy fruits should be mildly tender and blemish-free when eaten to be considered delicious. So I've got this peach that's somewhat more firm than tender, and there're a few specks on its flesh.
Can I say it can't ever be considered delicious? That's going too far.
But if it's a choice between a mildly tender and blemish-free plum and this peach, & all else is the same, under my own stated preferences, the plum is to be preferred if I'm looking for a delicious fruit.
Hope this helps!