This is an NA question.
The stimulus is abstract so to better understand what it’s saying, we should translate it into something more tangible.
Let’s take “Friends” as the example of the popular TV show. The stimulus is saying that selling reruns of “Friends” while “Friends” is still running on NBC can lead to decreased revenues for NBC. So in other words, new episodes of “Friends” are still being released on NBC but simultaneously, Season 1, 2, 3, etc.’s reruns are also being broadcast on, say, Netflix. The first sentence is saying that would be bad for NBC’s revenues. Okay, but why? I suspect that’s the conclusion.
This next sentence, however, doesn't support this. It just says the show's producers do earn a great deal of money from the sale of the syndication rights because the stations rerunning the programs are assured of a successful show. Okay, so when Netflix buys “Friends,” it’s assured of a successful show so it’s happy to pay the producers a great deal of money. But what does this have to do with NBC, the network, suffering a decrease in revenue? Nothing. This seems like just a throwaway claim. A concession claim.
"However" signals a transition from this throwaway claim, this concession point, to a premise. Good, I’m eager to know why NBC is going to lose money on this deal.
A recent study shows that over 80% of the programs that are made available as reruns and as first-run episodes during the same season suffer an immediate ratings drop for their first-run episodes.
Hmm, okay. So if Season 8 Episode 1 of “Friends” is premiering on NBC, but you've already sold the rights for Seasons 1 through 7 to Netflix, then it's likely that Season 8 Episode 1 is going to suffer an immediate ratings drop. Because that’s what happens 80% of the time.
So that's why NBC will lose money.
Wait a second. The premise is about ratings drop, but the conclusion is about losing revenues. Well, I know what kind of NA question this is. It's one where we have to connect some concept from the premise to some concept in the conclusion. We have to build a bridge from the premise to the conclusion.
For example, a bridge that says ratings drop is relevant to revenue decrease. If that’s not the case, then we have no premise. I mean it, because for something to be a premise, it has to lend at least some support. So if ratings drop had nothing to do with revenue decrease, then there is no premise because there's no support, in which case the argument falls apart.
That’s why (B) is the Correct Answer Choice. A drop in ratings has a negative effect on the network's revenues. This must be true.
Answer Choice (A) says programs that are sold into syndication early tend to be long-running hits that are likely to decline soon.
If this were an RRE question, maybe (A) would be relevant. Imagine the stimulus said something like, a recent study showed that over 80% of programs that are sold into syndication early suffered a ratings drop, and networks consequently experienced decreased revenues as a result. In spite of this, programs are still sold into syndication early. Why? Resolve, reconcile, explain it.
Well, now (A) might do some work. Why? Because the producers of the programs know that they are on the decline anyway and so they want to maximize the value of the shows before they’re completely worthless.
Answer Choice (C) says the price of syndication rights includes some compensation for the network's probable losses. This is not necessary. What if the price of syndication rights didn't include any compensation for the network's probable loss? Who cares? It's not like we're trying to figure out ways to incentivize the network to actually proceed with the deal of selling the syndication rights.
That’s what (C) is concerned with. (C)'s like, “Oh man, I'd better add something to sweeten the deal, otherwise NBC is going to back out of this. Oh, I know. I'm going to tell NBC that my purchase price for the syndication rights for “Friends” will include compensation for what you, NBC, might lose as a result of this deal.”
(C) makes sense in that way, but (C) doesn't make sense at all as a necessary assumption. In the argument, the deal is already done and we're just trying to say what the probable consequences are. It can lead to decreased revenue. And the only premise upon which we have to make this conclusion is because of the study showing the ratings drop. So once again, the assumption is between ratings and revenue. Nothing to do with (C).
Answer Choice (D) says the audience of a popular program will usually prefer first-run episodes to reruns. Okay, so the audience of “Friends,” they usually will prefer a new episode to reruns. That's not necessary.
Imagine it were false. The audience is either indifferent or actually they slightly prefer older episodes. What does that matter? It doesn’t because the premise is still what it is. A study came out that says 80% of programs that are made as reruns and as first-run episodes experienced an immediate ratings drop. On the back of that premise, which is still the only premise we have, we’re arguing that if you sell the syndication rights, it's going to lead to decreased revenue.
So what is (D) doing? How does (D) relate to the argument, if at all? I think (D) might be trying to explain why the study found what it found. Why is it that 80% of the programs experience ratings drop? Maybe it’s because of something having to do with what the audience prefers. But okay, that’s not our job. This isn’t a situation where we have a phenomenon (the study) and then we’re being asked to supply some hypothesis to explain the phenomenon.
Answer Choice (E) says most programs are never sold into syndication. This is not necessary. What if this were false? Imagine that all programs are sold into syndication at some point. It doesn’t matter. The argument is still what it is, with the same missing link that it always had. That missing link has nothing to do with what happens to most programs, whether they eventually get sold into syndication or not.
This is a Miscellaneous question.
According to the question stem, the analysis portion of the stimulus applies to the situation portion of the stimulus in the same appropriate way that would also apply to four of the answer choices. Note the word “EXCEPT” in the stem.
The question tests reasoning by analogy, reasoning from principle to application, and causal reasoning.
The situation is that a physical therapist (1) wants her patients to derive more enjoyment from the challenge of developing physical skills. She also (2) wants them to spend more time practicing those skills.
The analysis says success in meeting the first objective (derive enjoyment) will bring about success in meeting the second objective (spend more time).
The analysis seems appropriate for the situation as along as we make the (quite reasonable) assumption that enjoyment of an activity causes more time to be spent on that activity. If we view that causal assumption (extracted from the analysis) as a principle, then the situation can be viewed as an application of that principle. The analysis itself is a more general version of that causal principle.
In evaluating the answer choices, we can continue to use that framework and look for four more applications of the general principle. Alternatively, we can use the framework of analogies. We’re on the lookout for four analogous situations. On what grounds do we judge how analogous the new situations are to the existing one? In other words, what counts as “relevant similarity”? How well the new situations conform to the causal principle. The two frameworks converge.
Answer Choice (A) says a math teacher (1) wants her students to understand the mathematical principles taught in her course and (2) wants them to apply these principles routinely in everyday life. This is analogous. This is an appropriate application of the causal principle in the analysis.
If a math teacher is successful in getting her students to understand the principles of geometry, algebra, or statistics, then that will have a positive causal impact on their applying those principles in everyday life.
Answer Choice (B) says a software manufacturer (1) wants its customers to be more satisfied with the product and (2) wants them to place fewer calls to the service representative about how to use the product. This is analogous. This is an appropriate application of the causal principle in the analysis.
If the software manufacturer is successful in getting its customers to be more satisfied with the product, then its customers will be less likely to place calls about how to use it. There are many ways in which one can be unsatisfied with a product, of course, but one of those ways is not understanding how to use the product, which leads to (causes) customer support calls. If overall satisfaction is improved, then the problem of not understanding how to use the product will be mitigated to some degree. Whatever that level of improvement is should lead to (cause) fewer customer support calls.
Answer Choice (C) says a librarian (1) wants fewer of the books borrowed from the library to be lost or stolen, and he also (2) wants more of the books to be returned on time. This is analogous. This is an appropriate application of the causal principle in the analysis.
Of the entire set of books that are borrowed, some of them are lost and some of them are stolen. Lost is accidental whereas stolen is intentional. If the librarian is successful in reducing the number of lost or stolen books, then it is very likely that that will cause more books to be returned on time. Why? Because it’s precisely the books that would otherwise have been lost or stolen (which guarantees that they won’t be returned on time) that will now be returned on time.
Correct Answer Choice (D) says a hardware retail company (1) wants to construct a new, larger warehouse, and it also (2) wants its employees to help plan how the old warehouse will be expanded. This is not analogous. This is not an appropriate application of the causal principle in the analysis.
The first objective and the second are disconnected, and hence success in meeting the first has no causal bearing on success in meeting the second.
Success in meeting the first objective seems just as likely to have a positively causal impact on the second objective as it is to have a negative causal impact.
Imagine the first objective is successfully achieved. Congrats. You built a new, larger warehouse. How does that impact your second objective? I don't know. It could be positive or negative.
Maybe the old employees from the original warehouse are like, “I am revitalized with energy to make this work because we can't have the crew at the new warehouse show us up. We'd better do a really good job of expanding the old warehouse.”
But maybe the old employees are instead demoralized. They look at the second, new, larger warehouse and they don’t see why they need to do a good job planning the expansion of their current warehouse.
Answer Choice (E) says a concert series director (1) wants to present a more varied repertoire and (2) wants to attract new patrons. This is analogous. This is an appropriate application of the causal principle in the analysis.
If the director is successful in presenting a more varied repertoire (doing stuff that they haven't done before, new stuff), then it seems reasonably likely that they’ll attract (cause) new patrons (people who didn't come to the concert before because the repertoire was narrow).
This is a Parallel Flaw Method of Reasoning question.
The question tests your understanding of quantifier and conditional logic.
The argument in the stimulus translates to:
fl-journalist ←s→ sell-lax-mag → /self-respecting
__________________
/fl-journalist ←s→ self-respecting
The conclusion is flawed. The valid conclusion that could have been drawn is:
fl-journalist ←s→ /self-respecting
Generalizing from this particular flawed argument, the form is this:
A ←s→ B → /C
__________________
/A ←s→ C
We need to find the same form in one of the answer choices.
Answer Choice (A)’s premise translates to:
high-school ←s→ bio → /kindergarten
In order for (A) to be right, the conclusion should have said:
/high-school ←s→ kindergarten
Or in English, “Some kindergarten teachers are not high school teachers.” But it doesn’t say that. It says “Biology is not taught by all teachers.” That’s a valid conclusion. It follows simply from the premise that kindergarten teachers don’t teach biology.
Answer Choice (B)’s premise translates to:
sbm —m→ teacher → /prefer
Like (A), this is a good setup for (B) to be right. In order for (B) to be right, the conclusion should have said:
/sbm ←s→ prefer
Or in English, “Some non-school board members prefer admin work to teaching.” But it doesn’t say that. It says, “Few school board members prefer admin work to teaching.”
Correct Answer Choice (C)’s premise translates to:
student ←s→ prefer → /member
In order for (C) to be right, the conclusion needs to say:
/student ←s→ member
Or in English, “Some members of the Calculus Club are not students.” That’s exactly what the conclusion in (C) says. This is an invalid conclusion. The valid conclusion is “student ←s→ /member” or “Some students are not members of the Calculus Club.”
Answer Choice (D)’s premise translates to:
princ ←s→ harsh-disc → /adviser
In order for (D) to be right, the conclusion should have said:
/princ ←s→ adviser
Or in English, “Some advisers to a debate team are not principals.” But it doesn’t say that. It says, “Some principals are not advisers to a debate team.” That’s a valid conclusion.
Answer Choice (E)’s premise translates to:
popular ←s→ leave-early
coaches → /leave-before-3
(E) is already wrong for the fact that the premises do not connect.
As a Blind Review exercise, we can fix (E) up:
popular ←s→ leave-early → /coach
Fixing the premises like this gives (E) a chance. (E) could say that, therefore, some coaches are not popular teachers. That would be the same formal flaw in the stimulus and therefore make (E) the right answer.
This is a Principle question.
We are to extract from this argument by analogy the underlying principle. The right answer states the principle, and the argument in the stimulus is an application of that principle.
The argument contains a premise about SUV drivers and a conclusion about cancer and smoking. It’s an argument by analogy. In order for the reasoning by analogy to run through, both the premise and conclusion have to conform to some underlying principle. Otherwise, what happens with drivers and SUVs would have little bearing on cures for cancer and behaviors like smoking.
The premise says that drivers of SUVs have the correct belief that because they're in an SUV, they're better protected. They have lower risk of serious injury. As a result, their behavior changes. Because they know they’re safer, they start to drive more recklessly. They know the negative consequences are not as bad, so they start to take on more risk.
The conclusion says that the discovery of powerful cures for certain high-incidence forms of cancer would probably trigger an increase in behaviors such as smoking and overexposure to sun that are known to increase the risk of such cancers. If we have a cure for lung cancer, then more people would smoke more. If we have a cure for skin cancer, then more people would overexpose themselves to UV light.
Is this analogous to what was described in the premise? Yes, because there is an underlying principle at work here: mitigating or eliminating the negative consequences of an action invites increased participation in that action. Another way to state that is if the risk of harm is decreased, then people will engage more in that form of risky behavior. This unifying principle is what ties together these two totally different situations. It’s how this argument’s reasoning by analogy runs through.
Answer Choice (A) says when people believe that there are several measures they could take to reduce the risk associated with a certain activity, generally they will only take the measure that they believe will most reduce that risk. That’s not the principle at work here.
For the argument to conform to this principle, we’d have to show several measures to reduce the risk associated with driving and then have the driver pick the most effective one. So maybe one measure is to get into an SUV. A second measure is to put on your seatbelt. A third measure is to have airbags. The fourth measure is don't run red lights. According to (A), the principle here is that you assign some probability to each measure and then pick the measure that will most reduce the risk associated with driving.
Correct Answer Choice (B) says the development of ways to protect people from the consequences of behavior that would normally harm them often makes people less careful to avoid such behaviors.
Yes, that’s the principle. “Behaviors that would normally harm them.” What kind of behavior are we talking about here? If applied to driving, then we’re talking about reckless driving. That's behavior that normally would harm you. “The development of ways to protect you from the consequences of reckless driving” is putting you in an SUV. Because when you're in an SUV, it lowers the risk of serious injury as a result of accidents. And as a result, you are less careful to avoid reckless driving.
It’s the same in the conclusion. The behavior that normally would harm people is, say, smoking. If we develop ways to protect people from the consequences of smoking, i.e., lung cancer, then that's going to make people smoke more.
(B) is correct because it extracts the underlying principle that analogizes these two seemingly different situations.
Answer Choice (C) says that people generally take special care to avoid behaviors that they believe would likely lead to serious harm and generally do not take special care to avoid behaviors that they believe will not harm them at all. That’s not the principle at work here.
What behaviors would likely lead to serious harm that people are avoiding? Reckless driving? But if that's the behavior, there's no indication that people are taking special care to avoid reckless driving. What behaviors won't cause harm? The argument doesn’t say. (C) has a hard time mapping onto the argument.
We could make up an argument for (C) to map onto. In general, when traffic lights turn red, everybody stops. When the lights turn green, everybody goes.
This maps onto (C). People are taking special care to avoid behaviors (running a red light) that they believe will likely lead to serious injury. People are not taking special care to avoid behavior that they believe will not harm them (running a green light). In other words, people run green lights.
Answer Choice (D) says people generally exercise more care when performing activities that they know to have risky consequences than when performing activities of unknown risk. That’s not the principle at work here.
To illustrate the principle in (D), consider two activities. Activity one you know is risky. Activity two has a risk profile that’s unknown to you. It could be just as risky, less risky, or more risky than activity one. (D) is saying that people are more careful when performing activity one. This doesn’t map onto the argument.
Moreover, I'm not sure this is a reasonable attitude. If you don't even know the risk profile associated with an activity, wouldn't it be prudent to be extra careful just in case?
Answer Choice (E) says avoiding serious harm to themselves is given a high priority by people in their behavior but avoiding lesser harm is frequently outweighed by various desires. That’s not the principle at work here.
To illustrate the principle in (E), consider the serious harm of losing your arm. You’re going to be very careful to avoid that kind of harm. Now consider the less serious harm of getting a bruise. People regularly choose to risk getting bruised because they have other desires that are more important to them. For example, if you go hiking, you might get bruised. If you play basketball, you might get bruised. The desire to go hiking or play basketball often outweighs the lesser harm of getting a bruise.
If applied to driving, then avoiding serious harm is given a high priority by people in their behavior. That’s why people don’t run red lights. But avoiding less harm is frequently outweighed by various other desires like wanting to get to a destination faster. That’s why people speed. Speeding is not as serious as running a red light, but it does increase your chances of getting hurt (and hurting others).
This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.
The argument contains one premise and one conclusion. The premise is that last year and the year before, Browning (a town, presumably) experienced significantly more rainfall in September than in July. The conclusion is predictive. It predicts that this year, Browning will probably also experience more rain in September than in July.
This is a terrible argument and you intuitively understand why. Two instances is not enough data to establish a pattern when it comes to rainfall. Imagine if this argument had a premise that said, “Meteorological records indicate that over the past two hundred years, Browning experienced significantly more rainfall in September than in July.” Well, now we’re talking. This is a pattern and it supports a prediction that this year, Browning will probably also experience more rain in September than in July. At least that would be the default reasonable position and the burden would be on the person claiming this year to be an exception to provide the evidence. Why? Because when it comes to rainfall patterns, two data points isn’t enough and two hundred is. Where is the line between enough and not enough? Is 30 data points enough? What about ten? I don’t know, ask a meteorologist. But you and I both know that two isn’t and two hundred is.
The flawed method of reasoning in this argument is recurring. This is a type of analogy flaw. The argument tries to draw a conclusion about the future based on information about the past. The central assumption is that the future is relevantly similar to the past. That assumption may be true or it may be false. It all depends on what specifically we’re talking about in the premises and the conclusion. Here, in this premise, we have past information that is scant. And so the conclusion about the future is poorly supported.
Correct Answer Choice (B) points this out. It says the argument is weak because it draws an inference about a future event on the basis of a very limited number of instances of related past events. That’s it.
Answer Choice (A) says that the argument contains a premise that presupposed the truth of the conclusion. This is a charge of circular reasoning, of begging the question. This is descriptively inaccurate. The premise is a description of past events. The conclusion is a prediction of a future event. The premise (about what already happened) does not presuppose the conclusion (about what likely will happen) to be true. Here’s a circular argument guilty of the charge in (A): Last year and the year before, Browning experienced significantly more rainfall in September than in July. Therefore, in the past two years, Browning experienced significantly less rainfall in July than in September.
Answer Choice (C) says that the argument overemphasizes the possibility that average rainfall statistics could be skewed by large rainfall in one year. What? “Overemphasizes”? But that possibility wasn’t even present in the argument. (C) is descriptively inaccurate.
Answer Choice (D) says that the argument concludes that “two phenomena are associated.” Hold up. Is that an accurate description of the conclusion? The most charitable reading of the conclusion to accommodate (D) would be to interpret one phenomenon as amount of rain and the other phenomenon as time, namely what month it is, namely whether it’s September or July. Stretching the bounds of reasonable interpretation, we can map (D)’s description of the conclusion onto the actual conclusion. That the amount of rainfall is associated with whether it’s September or July. Okay, fine. Let’s check out (D)’s premise descriptor. Merely from the claim that there are “many instances in which both phenomena are present.” Uh, no. Our interpretation is broken. Many instances? The premise contains two instances. Last year and the year before. Last year, “both phenomena were present”? What does that even mean? Last year there was rain and there was September/July? See, that makes no sense.
Answer Choice (E) says that the argument uses evidence drawn from a source whose reliability cannot readily be verified. No, that’s not descriptively accurate. We have no idea where the historical data came from. We therefore have no idea if that source’s reliability can or cannot be readily verified.
This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.
The student claims that his paper was not graded in accordance with the professor’s stated criteria. That sounds like the conclusion. Okay, why not? What did the professor say the criteria would be? She said that she’d give As only to papers whose conclusions were supported by reliable statistical evidence. That’s a conditional. A → rse. His paper’s conclusion was supported by rse yet he got a B.
I don’t see what the problem is here. His paper met a necessary condition for getting an A. But he’s complaining that he only got a B? Oh, he must be confused about sufficient and necessary conditions. He thought rse → A. That’s why he thinks the professor should have given him an A.
This is the oldest mistake in the book. Correct Answer Choice (C) points it out. He takes a condition that is among the requirements (necessary) for a particular grade to be a condition that is enough to guarantee (sufficient) that grade.
Answer Choice (A) says the argument discusses the prof’s criteria as a distraction. But that’s descriptively inaccurate. The argument discusses the prof’s criteria in order to apply it to the case at hand, not to call attention away from anything.
Answer Choice (B) says the argument committed the descriptive premise to prescriptive conclusion flaw. That’s not what the argument does. The argument’s conclusion and premises are all descriptive.
Answer Choice (D) says the argument is based on the report of a biased participant in the controversy. Yes, this is descriptively accurate. The student is reporting the facts to us, facts about what the stated criteria was and facts about his paper. He is presumably biased. But so what? It’s not because of his bias that this argument is weak. His argument is weak because of a logical error.
Answer Choice (E) says the argument conflated the professor’s grading criteria with the objective criteria of a paper’s quality. What does this mean? (E) claims that there are two different criteria. There’s the professor’s criteria for grading (A only if rse). Then there’s the objective criteria for quality. What is it? (E) doesn’t say but presumably it’s different from the prof’s criteria. But there’s just one criteria. It’s not like the student argued that his paper met the prof’s criteria and therefore must be an objectively high-quality paper.
This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.
The argument opens with a general principle. Generally, it’s important that people practice what they preach but there are exceptions. The next sentence opens with “For instance…” which means we’re about to get premises. The argument is saying, “Let me show you instances of the exceptions, in case you don’t believe me.”
Okay, so what are the “instances”? Doctors don’t have to have healthy lifestyles in order to treat people. So that’s an instance. Also, logicians don’t have to be logical in their discussion of logic.
Had the argument simply been presented like that, then where we would question the reasoning would be on the two supposed instances “exceptions.” We could argue whether doctors are an exception to the rule or if they actually fit into the rule. We might argue that, actually, it's important for doctors to practice what they preach for whatever reason. This is what Answer Choice (B) tries to argue. And then we’d try to do the same for logicians. Do they fit the rule or fit the exception?
But the actual argument isn't just "For instance, doctors are an exception and logicians are an exception." The actual argument analogizes logicians to doctors. In so doing, the question of whether either fits the rule or the exception becomes entangled. They are no longer separate analyses.
The actual argument pegs whether logicians must practice what they preach to whether doctors must practice what they preach, as if answering the question for doctors reveals some information that answers the question for logicians. That is the crucial assumption at play.
- Assumption: With regard to whether it's important to practice what you preach, doctors and logicians are analogous.
- Premise: Doctors don’t need to have healthy lifestyles to treat people.
- Sub-conclusion: Logicians don’t have to be logical to discuss logic.
That assumption is fallacious because doctors and logicians are not analogous in that regard. This is what Correct Answer Choice (A) points out. If a doctor doesn’t practice what she preaches, then she can still effectively do her job of being a doctor: treat people. If a logician doesn’t practice what she preaches, then she can no longer do her job of being a logician: logically discuss logic. One can even question to what extent an illogical logician can even be considered a logician. Yet a doctor with an unhealthy lifestyle is no less a doctor. (A) points this out. It says that the argument is weak because it failed to take into account that logicians’ being illogical constitutes incompetence whereas physicians’ having unhealthy lifestyles doesn’t. This is where the two situations are relevantly dissimilar.
Answer Choice (B) says that the argument is weak because it fails to take into account that if a physician’s health deteriorates badly, the physician may not be able to treat patients effectively. This is descriptively accurate but it’s not where the argument is weak. We’ve already discussed how (B) fits into the argument above. (B) offers a reason for a doctor to “practice what she preaches” by pointing out what could happen on the far end of the spectrum. How effectively does this challenge a doctor being an “exception” to the rule? Not that effectively. The argument’s point stands for most cases. In general, a doctor’s having an unhealthy lifestyle does not prevent her from treating people, even though it’s true that if her health deteriorated badly, then she won't be able to treat people anymore. So (B) isn’t very effective in challenging the claim that doctors are an exception.
If we interpreted (B) to address the issue of the disanalogy, that would be even worse for (B). Let’s just assume that doctors aren’t exceptions, that they instead fit better into the rule. That they should also practice what they preach. If we grant this concession, (B) seems to be arguing that logicians also should not be exceptions to the rule either. The questionable aspect of the reasoning or why it feels wrong to us to say that logicians don’t have to be logical, according to (B), is that the argument fails to take into account that doctors actually do have to practice what they preach. See, says (B), doctors have to do it and so logicians should as well. Problem solved. Logicians do have to be logical, after all.
No. That entirely misses the point! The reason why the analogy failed in the first place is because doctors and logicians are essentially disanalogous when it comes to “practice what you preach.” Whether doctors have to or not reveals no information about whether logicians have to or not, because they’re dissimilar in that regard. They’re disanalogous. (A) pointed that out already. (B)’s reasoning still assumes that doctors and logicians are actually analogous; we just got the direction wrong, that doctors actually aren’t exceptions.
Answer Choice (C) says that the argument is weak because it fails to take into account that doctors who are incompetent to practice medicine can cause more harm than can logicians who discuss logic illogically. Okay, (C) tries to point out a difference between doctors and logicians. The problem is that (C) can’t point to just any difference. The difference has to matter. That’s what’s meant by “relevant” dissimilarity (if you’re trying to disanalogize) or “relevant” similarity (if you’re trying to analogize). What counts as “relevant” changes depending on what specifically the argument is talking about. Here, we are talking about why it’s important for logicians to practice what they preach yet not as important for doctors to practice what they preach. What’s “relevant” isn’t the disparate impact that doctors and logicians have on other people, because that doesn’t expose the disanalogy. What exposes the disanalogy is, again, what was already discussed in (A).
Perhaps a different argument will illustrate the point: doctors are required to attend four years of medical school and then complete four years of residency before they are allowed to practice their trade. Therefore, logicians should also be subject to similar educational requirements. This argument by analogy is vulnerable because of what (C) says. The reason why doctors are required to go through eight years of training is because they have the potential to cause great harm. This is a point of relevant dissimilarity between doctors and logicians. This dissimilarity is why the argument’s reasoning by analogy fails.
Answer Choice (D) says that the argument is weak because it fails to take into account that it’s more difficult to become logical than it is to modify an unhealthy lifestyle. Similar to (C), (D) points out a difference but not a relevant difference. The fact that it’s harder to become logical than it is to adopt a healthy lifestyle isn’t why the argument’s reasoning by analogy fails. Even if the two endeavors were equally difficult, the argument’s reasoning by analogy would still fail for the reasons stated in (A).
Answer Choice (E) says that the argument is weak because it fails to take into account that it’s not necessary for logicians to be logical in order to competently discuss logic, though it is highly desirable. No, it is both highly desirable and necessary for logicians to be logical in order to competently discuss logic.
This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.
The argument takes on a form that we’ve seen plenty before. It says that the Swahili civilization built a particular kind of tomb. Such tombs were widespread among the Oromo civilization and unknown among any other civilization that the Swahili had contacted. From these premises, the argument draws the conclusion that the Swahili were influenced by the Oromo.
Okay, that’s a bold assertion on thin evidence. All we know is that the Oromo also built these tombs. That doesn’t mean that the Swahili imitated the Oromo. It’s certainly possible. But it’s also possible that the Oromo imitated the Swahili. That’s an alternative hypothesis. To discriminate between them, we need more information. Maybe there’s some evidence consistent with one hypothesis but inconsistent with the other. Maybe there’s information about chronology. Who built these tombs first? That’d be a clue about who’s the influencer and who’s the imitator.
Answer Choice (A) says that the argument fails to adequately address the possibility that the Oromo used these structures as something other than tombs. That’s true. But that’s not where the argument is weak. Even if we stipulate that the Oromo used these structures as tombs, the argument still suffers from its causal weaknesses.
Answer Choice (B) says that the argument concludes that the first event caused the second event simply because the first event occurred earlier. If only! Information about the Oromo being first to build these tombs would be really helpful in establishing the conclusion that the Swahili learned from the Oromo. There is no such information so (B) is descriptively inaccurate.
Answer Choice (C) says that the argument draws a restricted conclusion from premises that provide strong support for a much broader conclusion. Uh, come again? (C) thinks this argument could have drawn a broader conclusion? And that the main weakness of the reasoning is that the actual conclusion didn’t go far enough? That’s crazy. The argument has a hard enough time supporting its existing conclusion. It won’t be helped if we swap that conclusion out for an even heavier, more expansive conclusion. I think (C) is picking up on the “to some extent” qualifier in the conclusion. Like, (C) is saying that’s what makes the argument vulnerable, that it should have just come out with a more forceful conclusion. But that misses the point. Toggling the strength of the causal arrow up or down is irrelevant. The problem with this argument is that the causal hypothesis in the conclusion is merely one of many.
Answer Choice (D) says that the argument assumes there was no third civilization responsible for creating the first tombs of the kind found in both the Oromo and Swahili cultures. This is a very attractive trap. It describes a cookie-cutter flaw that we’ve seen so many times in other Flaw questions. The problem is that the argument doesn’t make this assumption. The premises already established that the Swahili had no contact with any other civilization that built such tombs. That precludes the hypothesis that a third civilization was the true creators of these tombs and they were the OG influencers. That couldn’t have happened because the Swahili had no contact with any other civilization that built these tombs except the Oromo. Since this third culture hypothesis is already precluded, the argument doesn’t have to assume anything about whether they first created these tombs. It wouldn’t matter either way. Imagine if it were true that some third culture created the tombs. So what? They’re halfway across the continent and the Swahili didn’t have any contact with them. So if the Swahili learned it from anyone, it would still have to be from the Oromo. (D) is descriptively inaccurate. The argument makes no such assumption because the argument doesn’t have to. The alternative hypothesis that (D) is concerned with was already precluded by the premises.
Correct Answer Choice (E) says that the argument assumes that the Oromo built their tombs earlier than the Swahili did. Yes, that’s definitely an assumption that the argument makes. In order for the Oromo to have influenced the Swahili, the Oromo had to have done it first. If the Swahili got there first, then perhaps it’s the Oromo who were influenced by the Swahili. (E) is descriptively accurate. More than that, (E) is why the argument is weak. There is no information about who got there first. Without that information, we cannot say whether the Oromo as influencer hypothesis or the Swahili as influencer hypothesis is more likely to be true. This is precisely where the argument is most vulnerable to criticism.
This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.
The stimulus starts with other people’s (Smith’s) position (OPP). Smith proposed a new city ordinance prohibiting the use of a sleazy sales tactic. The author then insults Smith’s memory—okay. Then she says that four years ago, Smith owned a business that used the very same sleazy sales tactic. She concludes that Smith’s proposal does not merit consideration.
This is a terrible argument and one that we’ve seen many times before. It’s a source attack. If we want to oppose the ordinance, we should provide premises in support of that position. Attacking the source of the ordinance has no logical effect. It might be rhetorically effective, but that turns on how reasonable the audience is.
In general, source attacks fail. Just imagine how easily Smith can counter the author here. He just has to say something like, “Yeah, no shit. That’s how I know it’s a sleazy sales tactic and that’s why I’m proposing we ban it. I don’t have amnesia but you might have low-level brain damage.”
Correct Answer Choice (A) says the argument dismisses the ordinance because of its source rather than because of its content. This is exactly right.
Answer Choice (B) says the argument takes a single fact that is incompatible with a claim as enough to show that claim to be false. There are at least two issues with (B). First is simply that it’s descriptively inaccurate. The single fact (Smith’s business that used the sleazy sales tactic) is not incompatible with the claim (ban the sleazy sales tactic). That fact may actually be the reason for the claim. Second, even if (B) were descriptively accurate, what (B) describes isn’t inherently a flaw. Whether a single incompatible fact is enough to show a claim to be false depends on what the claim is. If the claim is that all cats are cute, you just have to show me one ugly-ass cat and that claim is dead.
Answer Choice (C) says the argument fails to make a needed distinction between deceptive and legitimate sales tactics. This is almost descriptively accurate. The argument did not make this distinction. But it also did not need to. The reason why the premise doesn’t support the conclusion has nothing to do with failing to define what a legitimate sales tactic looks like.
Answer Choice (D) says the argument draws a conclusion that simply restates a claim presented in support of that conclusion. This is a charge of circular reasoning, of begging the question. This is descriptively inaccurate. The premise is that Smith did something wrong. The conclusion is we should ignore Smith’s proposal to ban that wrong action in the future. These are two very different claims. The argument isn’t circular. Here’s a circular argument: Smith’s proposed city ordinance to prohibit the use of bait-and-switch sales tactics is ill-conceived. Clearly, it is utterly flawed.
Answer Choice (E) says the argument generalizes from a limited number of instances of a certain kind to all instances of that kind. This is an overgeneralization flaw. It’s descriptively inaccurate. Here’s an argument that commits that flaw: Smith’s appliance store uses sleazy sales tactics. Therefore, all of Smith’s businesses use sleazy sales tactics.
This is a Flaw/Descriptive Weakening question.
The stimulus starts with distinguishing categories of celestial objects. Stars versus planets. Stars generate light. Planets do not generate light, they only reflect it. Next, the argument defines a domain: this galaxy. It says that under this domain (in this galaxy), there are celestial objects that are neither stars nor planets, but it doesn’t give them names. (Fortunately, we already know their names: moons, asteroids, black holes, etc.) The argument then concludes that these nameless objects (i.e., these celestial objects that are neither planets nor stars) generate light.
Wait, what? The premises don’t support the conclusion at all! The premises establish that planets don’t generate light. It also establishes that there are other non-star, non-planet, nameless objects. But it says nothing about whether those nameless objects generate light. Where did that even come from?
As it turns out, Correct Answer Choice (E) reveals that the argument made the oldest mistake in the book: sufficiency-necessity. But this was such an unforced and bizarre error that it very successfully obscured itself. I certainly didn’t see this coming because I never would have expected the argument to confuse “planets don’t generate light (p→/gl)” with “only planets don’t generate light (/gl→p).” Had the premises established that “only planets don’t generate light” and there are non-star and non-planet objects, then those nameless objects would generate light. But the argument in fact only established that “planets don’t generate light.” It failed to consider the possibility that planets are not the only celestial objects that don’t generate light. For example, moons and asteroids also don’t generate light.
Answer Choice (A) says the argument failed to consider the possibility that this galaxy contains no celestial objects that reflect light other than planets. This is such an irrelevant consideration that I guess the argument failed to consider it. But that’s not why the argument’s reasoning is flawed. The conclusion is claiming that the nameless objects generate light. (A) is concerned with whether these nameless objects reflect light. Who cares if they reflect light or not?
Answer Choice (B) says the argument failed to consider the possibility that celestial objects in this galaxy comprise only a minute percentage of all the celestial objects in the universe. Similar to (A), this is such an irrelevant consideration that I guess the argument failed to consider it. But that’s not why the argument’s reasoning is flawed. The argument already established its domain: this galaxy. The conclusion does not exceed the bounds of that domain.
Answer Choice (C) says the argument failed to consider the possibility that celestial objects in this galaxy are not the only celestial objects that generate light. Similar to (A) and (B), this is such an irrelevant consideration that I guess the argument failed to consider it. But that’s not why the argument’s reasoning is flawed. (B) claims that there may be celestial objects in other galaxies that generate light. Okay, but who cares? The argument already established its domain: this galaxy. The conclusion does not exceed the bounds of that domain.
Answer Choice (D) says the argument failed to consider the possibility that there are numerous features that distinguish stars from planets besides the ability to generate light. Similar to (A), (B), and (C), this is such an irrelevant consideration that I guess the argument failed to consider it. But that’s not why the argument’s reasoning is flawed. It doesn’t matter what other features distinguish planets from stars. Stars tend to be bigger. Stars tend to live longer. Great. Who cares?