LSAT 154 – Section 1 – Question 26

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PT154 S1 Q26
+LR
+Exp
Must be true +MBT
Conditional Reasoning +CondR
A
7%
159
B
1%
154
C
29%
160
D
6%
157
E
56%
165
150
161
172
+Hardest 147.621 +SubsectionMedium

Philosopher: A person is morally responsible for an action only if that action is performed freely. And an action is free only if there is an alternative action that is genuinely open to the person. But an alternative action is genuinely open only if performing that alternative action is not morally wrong.

Summary

The stimulus can be diagrammed as follows:

Notable Valid Inferences

If someone is morally responsible for an action, then it is not the case that the alternative to that action is morally wrong.

If an action was performed freely, then it is not the case that the alternative to that action is morally wrong.

If someone is morally responsible for an action, then there is an alternative action that is genuinely open to the person.

A
An alternative action is not genuinely open to a person unless that person would be morally responsible for performing the alternative action.

Could be false. We know that moral responsibility is a sufficient condition for an alternative action being genuinely open; (A) mixes up the sufficient and necessary conditions of this relationship.

B
People are not morally responsible for most of the actions that they perform.

Could be false. The stimulus does not discuss any quantities; we cannot make any inferences about “most” actions that people perform.

C
A person is morally responsible for an action if there is an alternative action that is genuinely open to the person.

Could be false. We know that moral responsibility is a sufficient condition for an alternative action being genuinely open. Like (A), (C) mixes up the sufficient and necessary conditions of this relationship.

D
If it would be morally wrong for a person to perform a given action, then that action is genuinely open to that person.

Could be false. We know that if an alternative action is morally wrong, then that alternative action was not genuinely open. (D) misses the fact that this relationship discusses “alternative” actions. Also, the necessary condition is that the action is not genuinely open.

E
An action is not free unless there is an alternative action that is not morally wrong.

Must be true. As shown below, an action being performed freely is a sufficient condition for the alternative to that action not being morally wrong.

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