Unsupported. The passage only briefly mentions non-intellectual property transfer. This part of the text does not tell us how often the seller keeps some ownership rights. We know that it’s possible for the seller to keep some rights, but we don’t know if this happens in most of these transactions.

Unsupported. Here, we see that the notion of retained rights is applied to areas of law that don’t involve intellectual property (like real estate); we just don’t know if it’s only these areas of law that involve the notion of retained rights.

Just because the author only chooses to discuss the notion of retained rights in intellectual property in theoretical terms, that doesn’t mean that retained rights aren’t also being applied to intellectual property in real-world law. It is certainly possible that, in current law, the notion of retained rights of ownership is applied to intellectual-property law.

In order to support (C), we just need to show that it is possible to transfer the right to copy an item for profit under tangible-object theory. We know that when one owns an object, one may transfer ownership of that object. In fact, when you own an object, you can do anything you want with it, as long as it doesn’t violate anyone else’s rights. Nothing in the passage suggests that transferring copyright would violate other people’s rights. This shows that transfer of ownership of the right to copy is certainly compatible with the tangible-object theory.

Unsupported. We don’t know what happens under many real-world legal systems.

Unsupported. The passage doesn’t give this kind of restriction for intellectual property protections. From the passage, we can’t infer this kind of necessary condition for protecting computer programs.