Self-paced
A cognitive psychologist has claimed that intelligence is the ability to figure out how things work in order to overcome obstacles. ███ ████████ ██ ████ ██ ██████ █████████ ████ █ ██████████ █████ ███ ████████ ██ █████████████ ██ ███ ██████ █████ ██ █████ █████████ ███ ████ ████ ████ █████ █████████ █████████████ ████ ██ ██ ████ ████ ████ ███ ███████████ ██ ████ █████████████ ███ ███ ████████ ██ ███ ██████ ██ ████████ ████ ████████ █████████ ████████ █████ ███ █████████ ██████████████ ██████████ ██ ███████████
Argument Summary
The psychologist's definition of intelligence requires that a being has the ability to figure out how things work in order to overcome obstacles. It isn't enough to figure out how things work. You have to be doing it to overcome an obstacle. Take that purpose away and, by this definition, you no longer count as intelligent.
The author's response is to invent a hypothetical test case: a being who genuinely understands how things work, but who picked up that understanding with no obstacle in mind. According to the psychologist's definition, this being is not intelligent because the obstacle requirement isn't met.
The author's reply is basically, come on. We would obviously still call that being intelligent. So the psychologist's definition that would say this being is not intelligent is inadequate.
Who counts as intelligent?
Understands how things work
author: this whole circle is intelligent
...and did it to
beat an obstacle
beat an obstacle
psychologist: only
this is intelligent
this is intelligent
the imagined being:
understands, but not
to beat an obstacle
understands, but not
to beat an obstacle
The psychologist's yellow box leaves the being out. But we'd still call them intelligent, so the psychologist's definition is too narrow.
Note the direction of the complaint. The definition is too narrow. It draws the circle of "intelligent" smaller than our gut says it should be, and the imagined being falls in the part it wrongly leaves out.
13.
In the passage the author ████ █████ ███ ██ ███ ██████████
a
rejects a definition ██ ███ ███████ ████ ███ █████ ████████ ██ ███ ██████████ █████ ████ ██ ███████████ ██ █████████ █████ █████ ██ ██████
The author never says the definition is hard to apply, which is what "impractical to determine which cases it covers" means. Here's what actually happens: the author applies the definition to the imagined being with zero difficulty and gets a clean answer out of it, namely "not intelligent." The problem isn't that the definition is confusing to use or that you can't tell who it covers. The problem is that the answer it gives is the wrong one.
b
uses a hypothetical ███████████ ██ █ ██████████ ██ █████ ████ ███ ██████████ █████ ████ ████████████ ████████████████ ████████████
This accurately describes what the author does. "A hypothetical application of a definition" is the author imagining a being and applying the psychologist's definition to it. "Unacceptably counterintuitive consequences" is the result of that application: the definition forces us to call this being not intelligent, when every instinct we have says the being obviously is intelligent.
The one tricky thing is that the author never spells out the words "this is counterintuitive." It's left for us to see. When the author says "we would certainly not deny that that being possessed intelligence," that is the intuition the definition violates.
c
argues that a ████████ ██████████ ████ ███ ███████ ███ ███████ ██ ███ ███████ █████ ███████ ████████ ██████ ███ ███ ██████████ ██ ██ ███████
This is exactly backwards. (C) says the author's complaint is that the definition isn't narrow enough. But the author's complaint is the opposite: the definition is too narrow. It shuts out a being we'd call intelligent. If anything the author wants the circle drawn more broadly, not more narrowly.
d
rejects a definition ██ ███ ███████ ████ ██ ██ ████ ████████ ██ ████████ ███ ████ █████ ███████ █████ █████ ██ ██████ ██ █████ ██ ████████ ████ ███ █████
(D) says that accepting the definition would make "intelligence" apply to things it normally does not cover; in other words, the definition is over-inclusive. But the author's point is that it's under-inclusive: the definition would fail to apply to a being it should cover. The imagined being gets wrongly shut out from "intelligent," not wrongly let in.
e
argues against a ████████ ██████████ ██ ███ ███████ ████ █████ ███ ███████ ██ ██ ██ ██ █████ ██████ ██ ██ █████████████ ██████ ██ █████████
Nobody appeals to authority here, so there's nothing for the author to attack on those grounds. The bait is that the definition comes from a "cognitive psychologist," which sounds like an expert, so a careless reader might assume the author is accusing supporters of just trusting the expert. But the author does no such thing. The author takes the definition on its own terms and refutes it with a hypothetical counterexample. The argument is about the definition's content, not about who endorses it or why.