It has been claimed that an action is morally good only if it benefits another person and was performed with that intention; whereas an action that harms another person is morally bad either if such harm was intended or if reasonable forethought would have shown that the action was likely to cause harm.
This stimulus presents a few necessary conditions for an action to be considered good, and a couple distinct scenarios that are sufficient to declare an action bad.
If an action is good, then it must 1) intentionally 2) benefit another person.
If an action 1) intentionally 2) causes harm*, then itβs bad.
If an action 1) could be reasonably expected to cause harm, and 2) causes harm*, then itβs bad.
The correct answer will trigger one of these rules.
*This second sufficient condition is easy to miss because the stimulusβ phrasing suggests β
Which one of the following βββββββββ ββββ βββββββ ββββββββ ββ βββ βββββββββ βββββ ββββββ
Pamela wrote a ββββββ ββββββββββ ββ βββββ βββββββ βββββββ ββββββ βββ βββ βββββββ ββββ ββββββ ββ ββββββββββ βββ βββββββ ββββ ββββ ββββββ βββ βββββββ ββ βββββ βββ ββ ββββββ ββββββββ ββββββββ ββββ βββ βββ βββββββββ
Pamelaβs action did not in fact cause harm, so we canβt conclude it was bad.
If you chose (A), itβs likely you lost track of this condition because of the stimulusβ subtle phrasing β both principles about morally bad actions apply only to the narrow domain of β
In order to ββββββ β ββββββββββ βββββββ βββββββ βββ βββ ββββ ββ βββββββββ β βββββββ ββ βββββββ ββββββββ βββββββ βββββββββββ ββββββ βββ βββββββ ββββ βββββ ββ βββββ βββββββ ββββββββ βββββ ββ ββ βββββββββ ββ ββββ βββ βββ ββ βββββββ βββββββββββ ββββββββββ
Any judgment that an act is morally good is dead on arrival, because our principle only discusses moral goodness in a sufficient condition. Our principles give us no way of saying β[blah blah blah], therefore the action must have been good.β
Interestingly, the benefits of Jeffreyβs actions werenβt intentional (he was motivated by the promotion), so we can actually conclude his action was not morally good.
Intending to help βββ βββββββ ββββββββ ββ ββββββββ βββ βββββββ βββββ β ββββββββββ ββββββ βββββββββββββ ββββ βββ ββ βββ ββββββ βββββββ ββ ββββ βββββββ ββββ βββ ββββββββ βββ β βββ βββββ ββββ βββββββ ββββ βββββββ ββββ βββββββ βββ ββββ βββ βββββββββββββ
(C) involves an implicit judgment that Teresaβs action was morally good, which is dead on arrival, because our principle only discusses moral goodness in a sufficient condition. Our principles give us no way of saying β[blah blah blah], therefore the action must have been good.β
Marilees, asked by β ββββββββ βββ βββ βββββ ββββ βββ βββ βββ βββ βββββββββ ββββββββ βββββββ βββ βββ βββββ ββ ββββ βββββ ββ βββ ββββββ βββ βββββββββ ββ ββββββ βββ ββ ββββββ βββ ββββ ββββββββ βββββββββββββββ βββββββββ β βββββββ βββ βββββββ
The stimulus gives us two ways to conclude an action is morally bad:
- Harm plus intention.
- Harm plus reasonable expectation.
(D)βs scenario features harm, but it lacks both intention and a reasonable expectation of harm. We therefore canβt conclude Marileesβ action was morally bad.
Jonathan agreed to βββββ βββ ββββββββββββββ βββββ βββββ βββ ββββββ ββββ ββββββββ βββββββββ ββ βββββββββββββ βββ βββ βββ βββ βββ ββββ βββ ββββββ βββββ βββ βββ βββ ββ β ββββββββ ββββ ββββββ ββ ββββββββ ββ βββββ ββββββββββββ ββββββ βββ βββββββ ββββ
Hereβs the relevant principle from the stimulus:
If an action 1) could be reasonably expected to cause harm, and 2) causes harm*, then itβs bad.
Jonathanβs action β letting a toddler play unsupervised β comes with a reasonable expectation of harm. His action also did, in fact, cause harm. With both sufficient conditions met, we can properly conclude Jonathanβs action was bad.