Pamela’s action did not in fact cause harm, so we can’t conclude it was bad.

If you chose (A), it’s likely you lost track of this condition because of the stimulus’ subtle phrasing – both principles about morally bad actions apply only to the narrow domain of “actions that cause harm to others.” (A)’s scenario falls outside the scope of those rules.

Any judgment that an act is morally good is dead on arrival, because our principle only discusses moral goodness in a sufficient condition. Our principles give us no way of saying “[blah blah blah], therefore the action must have been good.”

Interestingly, the benefits of Jeffrey’s actions weren’t intentional (he was motivated by the promotion), so we can actually conclude his action was not morally good.

(C) involves an implicit judgment that Teresa’s action was morally good, which is dead on arrival, because our principle only discusses moral goodness in a sufficient condition. Our principles give us no way of saying “[blah blah blah], therefore the action must have been good.”

The stimulus gives us two ways to conclude an action is morally bad:

1. Harm plus intention.
2. Harm plus reasonable expectation.

(D)’s scenario features harm, but it lacks both intention and a reasonable expectation of harm. We therefore can’t conclude Marilees’ action was morally bad.

Here’s the relevant principle from the stimulus:

If an action 1) could be reasonably expected to cause harm, and 2) causes harm*, then it’s bad.

Jonathan’s action – letting a toddler play unsupervised – comes with a reasonable expectation of harm. His action also did, in fact, cause harm. With both sufficient conditions met, we can properly conclude Jonathan’s action was bad.