Self-paced
It has been claimed that an action is morally good only if it benefits another person and was performed with that intention; whereas an action that harms another person is morally bad either if such harm was intended or if reasonable forethought would have shown that the action was likely to cause harm.
The Principle(s)
This stimulus presents a few necessary conditions for an action to be considered good, and a couple distinct scenarios that are sufficient to declare an action bad.
If an action is good, then it must 1) intentionally 2) benefit another person.
If an action 1) intentionally 2) causes harm*, then it’s bad.
If an action 1) could be reasonably expected to cause harm, and 2) causes harm*, then it’s bad.
The correct answer will trigger one of these rules.
*This second sufficient condition is easy to miss because the stimulus’ phrasing suggests “
24.
Which one of the following █████████ ████ ███████ ████████ ██ ███ █████████ █████ ██████
a
Pamela wrote a ██████ ██████████ ██ █████ ███████ ███████ ██████ ███ ███ ███████ ████ ██████ ██ ██████████ ███ ███████ ████ ████ ██████ ███ ███████ ██ █████ ███ ██ ██████ ████████ ████████ ████ ███ ███ █████████
Pamela’s action did not in fact cause harm, so we can’t conclude it was bad.
If you chose (A), it’s likely you lost track of this condition because of the stimulus’ subtle phrasing – both principles about morally bad actions apply only to the narrow domain of “
b
In order to ██████ █ ██████████ ███████ ███████ ███ ███ ████ ██ █████████ █ ███████ ██ ███████ ████████ ███████ ███████████ ██████ ███ ███████ ████ █████ ██ █████ ███████ ████████ █████ ██ ██ █████████ ██ ████ ███ ███ ██ ███████ ███████████ ██████████
Any judgment that an act is morally good is dead on arrival, because our principle only discusses moral goodness in a sufficient condition. Our principles give us no way of saying “[blah blah blah], therefore the action must have been good.”
Interestingly, the benefits of Jeffrey’s actions weren’t intentional (he was motivated by the promotion), so we can actually conclude his action was not morally good.
c
Intending to help ███ ███████ ████████ ██ ████████ ███ ███████ █████ █ ██████████ ██████ █████████████ ████ ███ ██ ███ ██████ ███████ ██ ████ ███████ ████ ███ ████████ ███ █ ███ █████ ████ ███████ ████ ███████ ████ ███████ ███ ████ ███ █████████████
(C) involves an implicit judgment that Teresa’s action was morally good, which is dead on arrival, because our principle only discusses moral goodness in a sufficient condition. Our principles give us no way of saying “[blah blah blah], therefore the action must have been good.”
d
Marilees, asked by █ ████████ ███ ███ █████ ████ ███ ███ ███ ███ █████████ ████████ ███████ ███ ███ █████ ██ ████ █████ ██ ███ ██████ ███ █████████ ██ ██████ ███ ██ ██████ ███ ████ ████████ ███████████████ █████████ █ ███████ ███ ███████
The stimulus gives us two ways to conclude an action is morally bad:
- Harm plus intention.
- Harm plus reasonable expectation.
(D)’s scenario features harm, but it lacks both intention and a reasonable expectation of harm. We therefore can’t conclude Marilees’ action was morally bad.
e
Jonathan agreed to █████ ███ ██████████████ █████ █████ ███ ██████ ████ ████████ █████████ ██ █████████████ ███ ███ ███ ███ ███ ████ ███ ██████ █████ ███ ███ ███ ██ █ ████████ ████ ██████ ██ ████████ ██ █████ ████████████ ██████ ███ ███████ ████
Here’s the relevant principle from the stimulus:
If an action 1) could be reasonably expected to cause harm, and 2) causes harm*, then it’s bad.
Jonathan’s action – letting a toddler play unsupervised – comes with a reasonable expectation of harm. His action also did, in fact, cause harm. With both sufficient conditions met, we can properly conclude Jonathan’s action was bad.