What I dispense on flaw questions is a really close reading of the conclusion. I find an accounting of the conclusion's voracity is very important to seeing flaws.
Here we are told in the conclusion that if the results of the trial [referential phrasing] can be repeated then we can give access to people who are authorized and we can block out those who are not authorized.
The problem with a conclusion of that scope is that our evidence (the trial) only tells us about the blocking out of those who are not authorized. We are never given anything to indicate that this new system actually lets people who are authorized gain access. The evidence we are provided only supports half of our conclusion. In theory, the developers of this program could have designed a security system that no one can get into.
Please consider an analogous argument:
I have developed a new lock that is virtually impossible to key-bump and will never open with an unauthorized key in small trials
Therefore, if all goes well in these larger trials, I have developed a new lock that opens with an authorized key and is virtually impossible to key bump and will never open with an unauthorized key.
The flaw here is that I have not given any evidence that the new lock actually opens with an authorized key. I could have, potentially, developed a lock that no key, not even authorized keys can open.
Comments
What I dispense on flaw questions is a really close reading of the conclusion. I find an accounting of the conclusion's voracity is very important to seeing flaws.
Here we are told in the conclusion that if the results of the trial [referential phrasing] can be repeated then we can give access to people who are authorized and we can block out those who are not authorized.
The problem with a conclusion of that scope is that our evidence (the trial) only tells us about the blocking out of those who are not authorized. We are never given anything to indicate that this new system actually lets people who are authorized gain access. The evidence we are provided only supports half of our conclusion. In theory, the developers of this program could have designed a security system that no one can get into.
Please consider an analogous argument:
I have developed a new lock that is virtually impossible to key-bump and will never open with an unauthorized key in small trials
Therefore, if all goes well in these larger trials, I have developed a new lock that opens with an authorized key and is virtually impossible to key bump and will never open with an unauthorized key.
The flaw here is that I have not given any evidence that the new lock actually opens with an authorized key. I could have, potentially, developed a lock that no key, not even authorized keys can open.
Hope this helps
David
Thanks @BinghamtonDave . LSAC are a bunch of clowns lol. They even put the word
sometimesinto the AC. That completely threw me offsometimes