Support If you know a lot about history, it will be easy for you to impress people who are intellectuals. ███ ██████████████ ███ ████ ███ ████ ████ █████ ███████ ██ ███ ████ ████ ███ ████████ ████ █ █████ ██████ ██ ███████ ██████ ██████████ ██ ███ ███ ███ ████ ██████ ██ ███████ ███ ██ █ ████ ██ ████████ ██ ████ ███ ██ ████ ███ ███ ██ ███████ ██████ ███ ███ ██████████████
The author’s conditional conclusion is that if you’re not widely read—and therefore don’t know a lot about history—then it won’t be easy to impress intellectuals. As premises, he gives two conditional claims:
(1) If you know a lot about history, it’s easy to impress intellectuals.
(2) If you’re not well-read on history, you won’t know a lot about history (or, taking the contrapositive, to know a lot about history, you must be well-read on history).
This is the cookie-cutter flaw of mistaking sufficiency for necessity. The author treats “know history” as necessary for “impress.” But “know history” is sufficient, not necessary. So negating “know history” tells us nothing about “impress.”
In other words, the argument overlooks the possibility that one can not know a lot about history and yet still easily impress intellectuals.
The argument's reasoning is flawed ███████ ███ ████████ █████████ ███ ███████████ ████
many intellectuals are ███ ██████ ████ ██ ███████
there are people ███ █████ █████ ███████ ███ ██ ███ ███████ █████████████
it is more █████████ ██ ███████ ██████ ███ ███ ███ █████████████ ████ ██████ ███ ███ █████████████
there are other ████ ████ ██ ███████ █████████████ ████ ██ ███ ███████ ███████ ███████
people who are ███ █████████████ ███ ██ █████████ ████ ██████ ████ ██████ ███ ███ █████████████