This is a valid argument, unlike the stimulus. (A) isn’t claiming that jackals and wolves can interbreed, only that this premise doesn’t prove that they can’t. (A) would match the stimulus if it concluded “this proves that jackals and wolves can interbreed, because they belong to the same genus.”

This is the wrong flaw. (B) mistakenly conflates high probability (equatorial regions usually have more species) with absolute certainty (this region must have more species). By contrast, the stimulus erroneously negates both sides of a conditional relationship.

Note that (B)’s support actually compares species count for the two kinds of regions in question. The stimulus’ support doesn’t compare the tendency to fragment of the two kinds of societies. It only informs us about the ones with primarily financial value.

This is the wrong flaw. (C) mistakenly uses a subset (insects) to jump to a conclusion about a larger set (arthropods). By contrast, the stimulus erroneously negates both sides of a conditional relationship.

The author considers a conditional relationship (if poet, then metaphors). He then negates the relationship (if not poet, then not metaphors) and assumes it remains valid.

This is the same flaw as the stimulus: the negation of both sides of a conditional statement is not automatically valid. An analogous flawed argument for both cases would be: All apples are fruits. Therefore, anything that isn’t an apple (e.g. an orange) isn’t a fruit.

This is the wrong flaw. (E) mistakenly conflates a high probability that sophisticated machines are more trouble with absolute certainty. By contrast, the stimulus erroneously negates both sides of a conditional relationship.