PT111.S2.P4.Q25 > Analytics

Hide analysis

Ronald Dworkin argues that judges are in danger of uncritically embracing an erroneous theory known as legal positivism because they think the only alternative is a theory that they (and Dworkin) see as clearly unacceptable—natural law. ███

Dworkin's perspective · Judges shouldn't embrace legal positivism

Dworkin thinks they might embrace legal positivism because they think it's the only alternative to natural law.

Natural law · Says judges should interpret law by consulting own morals

Dworkin rejects this.

█████ ███████████ ███ ████ ███████ ██ ███ ███ █████████ █████ ████ ███ ███ ████████ ███ ██████ █████████ ███ ███████ ██ ███ ███ █████ ██ ██████ ██████████ ██ ███ ████ ███ ██ ████ ███ ███████ ██ █ █████ █████████ ████ ██ ████ █████ ███████████ ██████ ████████████ █████ ███████ ██ ██████████ ████ ██ ██ ██████ ████ ████ ███ ██████████ ██████████ ███ ███ ██ ██ ██ ██ ████████ ██ ███████████ █ ██████████ ███ ██ ████████ ████ ██ ███████ ██████ ██ ███ ████ ████ ████████████ █████ ███ ███████ ██ █ ████ ██ ███████ ██ ███████████ ███ ██████ ████████ ███ ███ ███ ███ ██ ████████ ████ ██ █████ ██ █████ █████ █████ ██ ██ ██████████ █████ ██ ██ █████ ████ ██ ███ ███████ ███ ███████ ████████████ ████ ██ ███████ ██ ██████████ ████ ██████████ ██ ███ ███████ ████████

Legal positivism · Meaning of law is based on social conventions

Just like how meanings of words are based on social conventions. According to legal positivism, disputes about meaning of law should be resolved by figuring out what's actually the consensus about the meaning.

Dworkin's perspective · Actual behavior by judges and lawyers isn't consistent with positivism

We need a theory that is based on what judges and lawyers actually do.

██ ██████████ █ ████ ██ ██████ ██████ ███████ ███ ██████ ███ █████ ███████████ ███████ ████████ ███ ████ ████ █████ ██ ██ ████████ █████ ██ █ █████████ ████ ███ ███ ███████ ██████████ ████ █████████ ███████ ██ ██████████████ ████ ████████ ██ █████ ██████████ ███ ██ ███████ ████ ██ ██ ██ ███ █████████ ██ █ ██████████ █████ █████ ███████ ██████████ ███ ███████ ████ █████ ████████ ██ ███████ ███ █████████ ██████ ███ ██ ██████ ████ ██ ███████ █████ ███ █████ ██████████ ██ ████████ ██ ██ ███████████████ ███ ████ ██ ███ ██ ███ ████ ██████ ███ ████ ██ ██████ █████ ███ ████████ ██ █████ ███████ ██████ ██ ███ ████████ █████ ██ ███ █████

Dworkin's theory · Internal logic of law

Meaning of law should conform to the internal logic of law and the principles that law is based on, regardless of conventions. Principles might involve appeal to morals, but this isn't like natural law, because internal logic still matters.

Elaborate on Dworkin's theory · Positivist are wrong in focusing only on what people think law means

The internal logic of law constrains how we might interpret law.

Passage Style

Critique or debate

25.

The passage suggests that Dworkin █████ ██ ████ ██████ ██ █████ ████ █████ ███ ██ ███ █████████ ███████████

Question Type

Implied

Other’s perspective

This is an Implied question about Dworkin’s perspective. Recall that Dworkin thinks judges shouldn’t embrace legal positivism or natural law theory. Instead, he offers his own theory, claiming that legal interpretation should conform to the internal logic of law.

Judges and lawyers ███ █████ ███ ██ ██████ █████ ██ █ ████ ██ ███ ██████ ██ █████ ██████

Unsupported. A legal positivist might agree with this, but Dworkin probably wouldn’t. Legal positivism claims that when there isn’t a consensus, there isn’t a legal fact of the matter, so judges should just determine the consensus or lack of consensus. Dworkin says this isn’t compatible with the actual practice of judges— they act as if there is a fact of the matter, even when there is no consensus. Dworkin’s theory seeks to validate their actual practice.

25%

Judges should not ███ █████ █████ █████████ ████ ██ █████████ ████ ███ ██████████ ██ █████ ███████████ ███ ████████ ███ ███ █████ ████████████

Unsupported. Dworkin implies here that judges shouldn’t use their moral intuition when it conflicts with the internal logic of the law, not the intentions of the law’s authors.

24%

Legal positivism is █ ████ ███████ ██████ ████ ███████ ███ ██████ ███████ █████ ██████████ ██████████ ███ ███████ █████

Unsupported. Dworkin does say that legal positivism is more popular than natural law theory. But he never claims that this is because legal positivism makes things easier for judges.

If there is █████████ █████ ███ ██ █████████ █ ████ ████ ███████ ██████ ███ ███████ ███ ████████ █████ ██ ███ ███ █████ ████████████

Unsupported. Dworkin’s theory is that legal interpretation should conform to the internal logic of the law. He never suggests that the internal logic of the law shouldn’t be examined if there is a consensus.

Legal positivists misunderstand ███ ████ ██ █████ █████████ ██ █████ ███████████████

Supported. In P2, we see that legal positivists think that law and morality are completely separate, and that legal interpretation should be based on consensus, not on morality. But Dworkin thinks that there can be room for moral intuition in legal interpretation.

43%

PrepTest 111 - Section 2 - Passage 4 - Question 25

Difficulty

Analysis

Answer Popularity

Question history

Answer five questions and we'll estimate your score.

Confirm action