This gets the sufficient and necessary conditions wrong. It says that the capacity for emotions is sufficient to display intelligence. But computers don’t have the capacity for emotions. So there’s no use in assuming anything about what that capacity would be sufficient for.

Regardless of how computer tech advances, the premise remains that computers will never have emotions, and this fact forms the entire basis of the argument. Since the argument rests on computers’ lack of emotions, and nothing will change their lack of emotions, any advances in computer tech are irrelevant.

The author assumes that someone or something is intelligent only if it can have emotions. But the ability to have emotions doesn’t imply the ability identify those emotions. So (C) isn’t necessary to the argument.

The argument is about whether computers can display intelligence at all, not about how intelligent they are. And there’s no need for a correlation between intelligence and emotional capacity to establish whether computers can or can’t display intelligence in the first place.

If the author didn’t assume this—if being intelligent were possible without a capacity to have emotions—then the argument’s sole premise would be irrelevant, and the conclusion would be entirely unsupported.