In P2, the author says that intellectual authority and institutional consensus are not the same thing. As evidence, he points out that some well-reasoned, intellectual arguments “never receive institutional imprimatur.” In other words, some arguments never receive institutional consensus or institutional support, even though they’re intellectual.

Actually, the author argues that intellectual arguments that “never receive institutional imprimatur” often do challenge institutional beliefs. This is why certain intellectual arguments go unrecognized and fail to gain institutional consensus.

The author doesn’t mention precedent until P4, where he explains that it can give legal systems both institutional and intellectual authority. In P2, he’s arguing that institutional and intellectual authority are not the same thing, since some intellectual arguments never receive institutional consensus.

The author is actually arguing that, even though some intellectual arguments are well-reasoned, they still don’t receive “institutional imprimatur,” or institutional consensus. This is not necessarily because the arguments are unconvincing; it might be because they “challenge institutional beliefs.”

P1 explains that institutional authority can depend on coercion, while intellectual authority is founded on good reasoning. In P2, the author explains that some well-reasoned, intellectual arguments don’t receive institutional consensus, suggesting that intellectual and institutional authority are distinct from one another. He never claims that these well-reasoned arguments rely on coercion.