The author likely believes this. He says that intellectual authority does not depend on coercion. But institutional authority uses the power of social institutions to enforce arguments; this may involve coercion.

The author probably does not believe this. While intellectual authority is founded on well-reasoned arguments, we can’t conclude that institutional authority never accepts well-reasoned arguments. In fact, the author says that institutional authority enforces arguments that “may or may not” possess intellectual authority. This suggests that the two can overlap; institutional authority sometimes does enforce, and thus accept, well-reasoned arguments.

The author likely believes this. He says that intellectual authority does not depend on convention. But institutional authority uses the power of social institutions to enforce arguments. In doing so, institutional authority may depend on social convention.

The author likely believes this. He says that intellectual authority sometimes challenges institutional beliefs. But institutional authority can’t challenge institutional beliefs. Why? Because revision and reconsideration are a form of intellectual authority and thus cannot be a form of institutional authority. In other words, as soon as you challenge institutional beliefs, you’re practicing intellectual authority.

The author likely believes this. In P4, he says, “the conflict between intellectual and institutional authority in legal systems is thus played out in the reconsideration of decisions.” Intellectual authority sometimes challenges and conflicts with precedent, but institutional authority can’t conflict with precedent, since precedent is a form of institutional authority.