Support For each action we perform, we can know only some of its consequences. ████ ███ ████ ████ ██ ██ █████████ ███ ██ ████ ████ ██████ ██ ███████ █████ █████ ██ ████ ██ ██ ████████ █████ ███████ █████ ████ ███ ████ ██ ███ ████████ ██████ ███ ████ █████████████
The view that we can’t know what action is morally right would be true if an action’s being morally right were the same as the action’s having the best consequences. Why? We can only know some of the consequences of an action we perform.
The conclusion is about the possibility of determining if an action is morally right, but the argument’s premise says nothing about actions being morally right.
How to get from premise to conclusion? Based on the premise of the argument, we know that we can know only some consequences of an action we perform. The argument’s conclusion (that the view that in no situation can we know what action is morally right would be true if an action’s being morally right were the same as the action’s having the best consequences) would follow logically if we assume that an action having the best consequences is equivalent to only knowing some consequences of that action.
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