When presented with the evidence against him, Ellison freely admitted to engaging in illegal transactions using company facilities. ββββββββ βββ βββββββ ββββββββ βββ ββββββββ ββ βββββββββ βββββββββ βββββββββ ββββββββββββββ ββββββββββ ββββββββ βββ βββββββ βββ ββββββ ββββ ββ βββββββββββ ββββββ ββ ββββββ βββββββββββ ββββ βββ ββββββββ ββββββββ βββββββ ββββ
At first blush the stem reads a bit like a Pseudo Sufficient Assumption question, with all its talk of illustrating principles and such. But it’s just a Parallel question: the argument in the stimulus makes a judgment that illustrates a principle, and the answer choices will also make judgments that (presumably) illustrate principles.
So our job is to read the stimulus and extract the abstract principle behind the judgment, then look for the answer choice in which the judgment relies on that same abstract principle.
Get ready for a preview of your 1L Criminal Law class! The principle at play here is known by lawyers as the “fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.” Under Fourth Amendment law, if evidence of a crime was obtained illegally (e.g., through a warrantless wiretap), that evidence is inadmissible in court. If the method used to obtain the evidence (i.e. the tree) is tainted, any evidence obtained using that method (i.e. the fruit) is also tainted.
Our stimulus establishes that the company obtained damning evidence of Ellison’s guilt via illegal means, and concludes that the company cannot justifiably punish him.
We’re looking for answers that tell a similar story – we know someone is definitely guilty of wrongdoing, but we only know that because of our own improper behavior, so we can’t punish them.
Spoiler alert: the wrong answer choices in this question mostly fail to match the improper means piece. It can’t just be that improper stuff was going on at some point – the improper behavior must be the method used to obtain the evidence.
Which one of the following βββββββββ ββββ βββββββββββ βββ βββββββββ βββββββββββ ββ βββ ββββββββ ββββββ
After Price confessed ββ ββββββ ββββββ βββββ ββββ ββββ ββββ β ββββββ ββ βββββββ ββββββ ββββ βββββ ββββββββ ββββ ββββββ βββββββ βββββββ ββββββ ββββ βββ βββ βββββββββ ββ ββββββ βββββββ ββββββ βββββββ ββββ
This illustrates the principle that criminal revenge is not justified. The stimulus is concerned with improperly-obtained evidence, not eye-for-an-eye revenge.
Shakila's secretary has ββββββββ ββββ ββ ββ βββββββββ βββββββββ βββββ ββββββββββ βββββββ ββββββ βββ βββ βββββββ βββββ βββ ββ βββββββββ ββ βββββββββ ββββ βββββββ βββββ βββ ββββ βββ βββ ββββ ββββββ
The key difference here is that Shakila's improper behavior is not the means by which she found out about her secretary's wrongdoing. (B) is about hypocrisy being bad, which is a nearby but distinct idea.
After Takashi told βββββββ βββββββ ββββ ββ βββ ββββ βββ ββ βββ ββββββ ββ ββββββββ βββββ βββββββββ ββ ββββββββ βββ ββββ ββββ ββ βββββββ ββββββββ βββββββ βββ ββββββββ βββ βββββ ββββββ βββ βββββββ βββββ βββββββ βββββββ ββββββ βββββββββββ ββββββ βββ ββ ββββ βββββ
This illustrates the principle that one should not be punished for wrongdoing if they were reported by someone who also did something wrong. It's a bit like (B), but without the direct hypocrisy. We need improperly obtained evidence, not evidence obtained by someone who has also done improper stuff.
After a conservation βββββββ ββββββββββ βββββ βββββββ ββββββββ ββββ ββ βββ βββ βββ βββββββ ββββββ βββββ ββ βββ βββββ ββββ βββββββ βββ βββ βββββββββββ ββ βββ βββββ βββ ββββββββββββ βββββββ ββββββ βββββββββββ ββββββ βββββββ ββ ββββ βββββ
Here's the match. We know Kuttner committed a crime because he confessed to the officer who caught him. But the officer only caught him because she was trespassing, so she wouldn't be justified in punishing Kuttner. Kuttner's confession was obtained via improper means β it's the fruit of a poisonous tree.
Ramirez was forced ββ βββ βββββββββ ββ βββ ββββββββ ββ βββββ ββββ βββ ββββ βββββ βββ ββββ ββ ββββββββ βββ βββββ ββ βββββββ βββββββββ ββββββββ βββββββββββββ βββ βββββ ββ βββββββββ ββββββ βββββββββββ ββββ ββββββ βββββββ ββββββββ βββββββ ββ ββββ βββββββββ ββ βββ ββββββββ ββββββ ββββββ ββ βββββββ ββββββββββββββ
This illustrates the principle that one should not punish someone for a crime that one has excused others for committing. The stimulus is about improperly-obtained evidence, not consistency.