Since Support anyone who makes an agreement has an obligation to fulfill the terms of that agreement, it follows that Support anyone who is obligated to perform an action has agreed to perform that action. ██████ ██████ ████ ███ ███ █ █████ ██████████ ██ ███████ █ █████ ██████ ██ ███ ████ ██ ██████ ████ ███ ██ ████████ ██ ███████ █████ █████████ ██ ███████ ████ ███████
The argument concludes that having a legal obligation to perform a certain action is the same as having agreed to perform that action. Why? Because agreeing to perform an action obligates someone to perform that action. From this, the argument draws the sub-conclusion that being obligated to perform an action must mean that one has agreed to perform that action.
The argument has a cookie-cutter flaw: confusing sufficient and necessary conditions. Just because an agreement to perform an action is sufficient to create an obligation to perform that action, that doesn’t mean an agreement has necessarily been made for every obligation. There might be other ways an obligation is formed.
The argument also baselessly treats “legal obligations” and “obligations” as equivalent by saying that they are “the same.”
Which one of the following ██████████ ████ ██████████ █████████████ ███ ██████████ █████████ ██████
The argument fails ██ ████ █ ███████ ███████████ ███████ ██ ██████ ███ ██ ███████ █████████ ██ ███████ ███ ██ ██████ ████ ████ █████████████ ███ ██ █████ ███ ███████ ████ ██████████ ████ ██ █████ ███████████ ██ ████ ██ ███████████ ██████████
The argument doesn’t deal with actions with good consequences at all, so it isn’t a flaw to not distinguish them from legally obligated actions.
The argument takes ███ ███████ ████ █████ ███ ███████████ █████ ████ █████ █████████ ████ ██████████ █████ ███ ██ █████ ██ ████████ ███ ███████████ ████ ███████ ████ ██████ ██████████ ████ ███ █████████ █████████ ███ ███████ █████ ████ ██ ██████ █████ ███████████
The argument doesn’t take for granted that there are obligations that don’t result from agreements, or even consider that possibility. It’s also irrelevant to the argument why people make actions that uphold agreements.
The argument contains █ ███████ ████ ██ █████████ ██████████ ██ ███ ███████████ ███ ██ █████ ███ ███████ ████ █████ ███ ████ ███████ ███████ ████ ███ ██████ █████ ██ ████████
The argument’s premise is not equivalent to its conclusion, and it doesn’t make any claims about what kinds of actions one should or shouldn’t agree to perform.
The argument treats █ █████████ ████ ██ ██████████ ██ ████ █████████ ██ ██████████ ██ ████ █ ███████████ ███ █████████ ██ ██ ██ ███████████ ███ ██ █████ ███ ███████ ████ ███ ██████████ ██ ███████ ██ ██████ ██ █ █████ ███████████
The argument treats a sufficient condition for an obligation—agreeing to perform an action—as a necessary condition, without considering that obligations can come from other sources. It also claims that legal obligations are “the same” as any other obligation to act.
The argument rests ██ ██ █████████ ███ ██ ███ ████ █████████ ███ ██ █████ ██ ████████ ███ ███████████ ████ ██████ ███ █████████ █████████ ██ ███████ ███████ ████ ████ ████ ██████ ██ ████████
The argument uses the term “action” consistently. It also doesn’t make any claims about people’s willingness to perform actions they’ve agreed to, only about their obligation to do so.