PT133.S4.P1.Q4 > Analytics

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In Alaska, tradition is a powerful legal concept, appearing in a wide variety of legal contexts relating to natural-resource and public-lands activities. ████ █████ ███ ███████ ████ ██ ███ ██████ ██████ ██████ ██████████ ███ ██████████ ██ ███████████ ███████ ██ █████████████ ██████████ █████ █████████ ██████████ ████ ███ ██████████ ███ ██ █████ ██ ███ ██████████ ██ █████████ ████ ███ ████ ███████████ ██ ██████ ████████ ████████ █████ █████ ██ ██ █ ███████████ ████ ███ ███████ ██ ████████ ███████ ██ ██████ ███████████ ███████ ██ ███████ ███ ███ █████ ████ ██ ███████████ ███ ████████████ █████ ████████

Problem · Failure to define "tradition" in statutes

Statutes in Alaska fail to define "tradition," which leads to problematic and inconsistent results.

Common legal understanding of "tradition" · Must be based on "long-standing" practice

"Long-standing" in terms of time, but also in continuity and regularity of a practice.

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Examples of problem · Two court cases involving indigenous use of sea otter pelts

Context for the two court cases · Between 1910 and 1972, natives couldn't hunt sea otters

In 1972, a statute was passed allowing natives to hunt, but only for use in making authentic native articles by means of "traditional native handicrafts."

Additional context · Government agency didn't consider items made from sea otter pelts to be authentic native articles

This is because these items weren't made "within living memory." (Recall that sea otter hunting was prohibited for natives between 1910 and 1972.)

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First court case · Government agency's interpretation was upheld

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Second court case · Government agency's interpretation overturned

Court heard testimony showing that before Alaska was occupied, natives had used sea otters for many things. This showed that making stuff out of sea otter pelts was "traditional." The gov agency's interpretation of "traditional" was too narrow.

Passage Style

Problem-analysis

Single position

The passage most strongly suggests ████ ███ █████ ██ ███ ████ ████ ████████ ████ █████████████ ██████ ██ ███████ ██ █ ███ ████

Question Type

Implied

The 1986 case is discussed in P4. The court upheld the FWS regulations, which stated that if a handicraft hadn’t been produced “within living memory,” it didn’t count as an authentic native article. So the court must have believed that “traditional” should be defined along the lines of the FWS’s interpretation, which is that traditional practices must have continued through recent history.

reflects a compromise ███████ ███ █████████ ████████ ███████████ ███ █████ ██ ████

Unsupported. The 1986 case didn’t favor compromise; it fully favored the FWS’s position.

emphasizes the continuity ███ ██████████ ██ █████████ ██ █████ ███ ████ ██ ███████

Strongly supported. The court upheld the FWS regulations, which stated that if a handicraft hadn’t been produced “within living memory,” it didn’t count as an authentic native article. So the court must have believed that “traditional” should be defined along the lines of the FWS’s interpretation, which is that traditional practices have continued through recent history with some regularity.

83%

reflects the term's █████ ██ ████████ █████████

Unsupported. This is closer to the 1991 court’s interpretation, which was that the meaning of “traditional” shouldn’t defy common sense. But we’re interested in the 1986 court’s interpretation, which was that the FWS was right: “traditional” should mean something that’s been practiced “within living memory.” And nothing in the passage suggests that this interpretation is consistent with everyday usage.

encourages the term's ███████████ ██ ████████ ██████████ ██ ████ ██ ████████ ██████████

Unsupported. The court agreed with the FWS that for something to be “traditional,” it must have been practiced “within living memory.” This doesn’t mean that traditional practices should include new activities; it just means that traditional practices should be continuing through to the present day.

reflects the concerns ██ ███ ██████ ████████ ██ ████ ████ ████████ ██ ██ ███████████ ██████████

Anti-supported. The 1986 court didn’t interpret “traditional” in a way that reflected the concerns of Katelnikoff. Instead, it favored the FWS’s position.

PrepTest 133 - Section 4 - Passage 1 - Question 4

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