Not quite. The reasons for the 1991 ruling involved the fact that the Alaska Natives were forced to stop their handicraft because of circumstances beyond their control. (A) doesn’t involve any circumstances beyond people’s control. It just says the handicraft was once practiced and then stopped. The timescale in (A) is also way off from the timescale in the 1991 case. In the 1991 case, the handicraft was practiced up until only a few hundred years ago (late 1700s). Since we don’t know what the 1991 ruling would have been if (1) the practice had stopped millennia ago and (2) there weren’t circumstances beyond people’s control, that ruling doesn’t make good precedent for (A).

The 1991 ruling didn’t say that something counted as “traditional” if it involved hunting several endangered species. It said something counted as “traditional” if it was once common practice before being forced to stop.

The 1991 ruling said that something counts as “traditional” if it was once common practice but then was forced to stop by extenuating circumstances in more recent history. (C) describes the same kind of scenario. So the 1991 ruling would be relevant as precedent for this case.

The 1991 ruling didn’t say that something counted as “traditional” if it involved a historically little-known practice. To the contrary, it said something counted as “traditional” if it was once common practice (and was then forced to stop).

The 1991 ruling didn’t say that something counted as “traditional” if it simply isn’t common now. It said something counted as “traditional” if it was once common practice before being forced to stop. (E) doesn’t tell us whether the handicraft was once common or why it’s uncommon now, so the 1991 ruling isn’t relevant precedent here.