Ethicist: Marital vows often contain the promise to love "until death do us part." If "love" here refers to a feeling, then this promise makes no sense, for feelings are not within one's control, and a promise to do something not within one's control makes no sense. █████ ██ ███████████████ █████ ██████ ███████ █████████████ ████ ██████ ██ ████ ███████ ██ ██ █████████ ██ █████████
Marital vows often contain a certain promise that uses the word “love.” The author concludes that “love” in this context should not be interpreted as referring to feelings. This is because the promise would make no sense if “love” referred to feelings.
The conclusion asserts that we should not interpret the word “love” as referring to feelings in the context of a certain promise. But the premises do not establish when one should not interpret a word in a particular way. The premises only establish that interpreting “love” as referring to feelings makes no sense. So to get from the premise to the conclusion, what’s missing is the principle that if an interretation makes no sense, one should not use that interpretation.
The ethicist's conclusion follows logically ██ █████ ███ ██ ███ █████████ ██ ████████
None of our ████████ ███ ██████ ███ ████████
People should not ████ ████████ ██ ██ █████████ ████ ██ ███ ██████ █████ ████████
"Love" can legitimately ██ █████ ██ █████ ██ █████████ █████ ████ █████████
Promises should not ██ ███████████ ██ ████ █ ███ ████ ████ ████ ██ ██████
Promises that cannot ██ ████ ██ ███ ████ ███ ██████