This might look promising, but it's not concrete enough to really affect the argument. For one, this only happens "sometimes," so we don't know whether it's a common or rare occurrence. For another, we don't know to what extent profitability is impacted by failing to make the best use of the most versatile employees—it could make only a tiny difference. So this isn't enough to weaken the argument.

Perry's argument about what risk-averse lenders should do is based on premises about the features of worker-owned businesses, not an appeal to lenders' current behavior. How high-risk lenders operate just isn't relevant to the level of risk that's actually associated with lending to different types of businesses.

Like (B), this focuses on how lenders currently behave, which is a totally different question from what level of risk worker-owned businesses pose to lenders in reality. We can't just assume that the lower chance of receiving start-up loans is tied to an inherent risk level, and even if we could, that would strengthen rather than weaken Perry's argument.

Like (B) and (C), information about how worker-owned businesses are usually funded isn't relevant to the risk posed by these businesses without futher information. To weaken the argument, we need to know why risk-averse lenders should actually be interested in worker-owned businesses, and this doesn't help us with that.

In other words, worker-owed businesses mitigate their inherent inefficiencies through hard work. This adds a benefit to balance out the costs highlighted by Perry, and by neutralizing those costs, undermines the idea that worker-owned businesses are actually less profitable. In turn, that takes away the reason to believe that worker-owned businesses are high-risk, which weakens the conclusion.