Support If rational-choice theory is correct, then people act only in ways that they expect will benefit themselves. βββ ββββ βββββ ββββ βββββββββββββββ ββββββ ββββββ ββ ββββββββ βββββββ ββββββ ββ ββββββββ βββββ ββ ββββββ ββββββ ββ ββββ ββββ ββββββ ββ ββ ββββββββ βββββββ βββββββββββ
The author argues that rational-choice theory is not correct. She supports this by saying that if it were correct, then people would only act in ways that they expect will benefit them, but there are many examples of people acting in ways that do not benefit them.
By showing that many people act in ways that donβt benefit them, the author assumes that sheβs negating the necessary condition for rational-choice theory being correct. But in reality, the necessary condition is that people will always act in ways that they expect will benefit them.
Itβs possible that people expected to benefit from their actions, even though they didnβt benefit. In this case, the author canβt conclude that rational-choice theory is incorrect.
The argument above is most ββββββββββ ββ βββββββββ ββ βββ βββββββ ββββ ββ
assumes as a βββββββ βββ ββββββββββ βββ ββββββββ ββββββββ ββ βββββββββ
concludes that a ββββββ ββ βββββ ββββββ ββ βββ βββββββ ββββ βββ ββββββββ βββ ββ ββ ββββββββββββ
takes for granted ββββ ββββββ βββ βββ ββββββ ββ ββββ ββββ βββ ββββββββββ ββββββββββ ββββββββ ββββ βββββ βββββββ βββββ ββ ββββββββββ ββββββββββ
presumes, without justification, ββββ ββββββββ ββ ββββββ ββββββ ββ ββββ ββββ βββ βββ ββββββββββ ββββββββββ βββββββ βββββββββ ββββββββ ββ ββββββ ββββββ ββ ββββ ββββ βββ ββββββββββ ββββββββββ
fails to consider ββββ ββββββ ββββββ ββ ββββ ββββ ββββββ ββ ββ ββββββββ βββββββ βββ βββββββββββ ββββ ββββββββ ββββ ββββββ ββ βββββ ββββ βββββ βββββββ ββββββββ βββββββ