This makes concrete the author’s assumption that physical crashes provide no more non-safety information than simulated crashes. It means manufacturers wouldn’t lose out on other information by switching from physical crashes to simulated ones.

This supports future manufacturers using simulated crashes—not reducing the number of physical crashes. It doesn’t address the author’s assumption that there’s no advantage to physical crashes over simulated crashes.

This suggests simulated crashes are useful, not that physical crashes are useless. It doesn’t address the author’s primary assumption—that there’s nothing manufacturers can get from physical crashes they can’t get from simulated crashes.

This is irrelevant. It doesn’t suggest that cost considerations will become more significant in the future when deciding whether to conduct physical or simulated crashes.

This is irrelevant. It suggests crash simulations are useful in an analogous field: aviation. It doesn’t say that either airplane or automobile manufacturers will run fewer physical test crashes if simulations improve.