Self-study
Support Katelin says that we will be hit by a major snowstorm tomorrow. ██ ███ ████████ ████████ ████ ██████████ ███████ ███ ████ ████ ██ █████████ ███ ██ ████ █████████ ███ ██ ████ ██ ██ ███ ███ ██ █ █████ ██████████
The Big Brain Approach
If you’re well versed in the curriculum and you’re tracking the dynamics that matter most, you can dispense with this question entirely during your shallow dip – I’m talking a minute or less.
Every wrong answer fails because it introduces one or more type of claim that the stimulus does not. All these claim-types are common and fundamental enough that you should aspire to flag them right away when they suddenly appear in the answer choices:
There are no might/possibly claims in the stimulus – (A) and (D)
There are no most claims in the stimulus – (C) and (D)
There’s no causal language in the stimulus – (E)
There are no knowledge claims in the stimulus – (A) and (E)
If you’ve done your homework, your experience of this question should run as follows:
1: Recognize “facts vs. beliefs” as the stimulus’ flaw (for more on that, see the explanation below).
2: Eliminate (A), (C), (D), and (E) for the reasons stated above during your shallow dip.
3: Confirm that (B) matches, then pick it and move on.
Facts vs. Beliefs In The Stimulus
Here’s how the facts vs. beliefs vs. knowledge distinction appears in the stimulus:
Premise 1: Katelin believes a snowstorm is coming.
Premise 2: It is a true fact in the world that the car show will be canceled if the snowstorm hits.
For Katelin to make the connection that the car show will be canceled, she must be aware of the fact in Premise 2. But people aren’t always aware of everything – it’s a big leap to assume that just because some fact is true in the world, it must also exist as a belief in some particular person’s head. So that’s this argument’s flaw – the belief claim in its conclusion isn’t supported by Premise 2’s fact claim:
Conclusion: Katelin (probably) believes the car show will be canceled.
25.
The questionable pattern of reasoning ██ ███ ████████ █████ ██ ████ ███████ ████████ ██ ████ ██ █████ ███ ██ ███ ██████████
a
Jorge says that █████ ███████ █████████ ███████ ████ ███████ ██ █████████ █████ ████ ██████ ████████ █████ ██ ████████ ████████ ████ ███ ███████████ ████ ██████ █████ ██ ██ ██████ █████ ████ █████████ █████ ███ ██ ███████ ██ ████
The shallow dip explanation suffices: there are no might/possibly claims in the stimulus. This is a mismatch in logical strength (specifically modality, or likelihood). Logical strength matters a lot in Parallel (and Parallel Flaw) questions.
If you want practice tracking this question’s core concepts, though, here’s a full breakdown of (A)’s structure, with matching structural elements italicized and mismatches bolded.
The first sentence introduces a whole “since this, therefore that” mini-argument that is absent in the stimulus:
Premise 1: Jorge [believes] that [Premise 0: today’s pollution levels are ____; Minor Conclusion: Many species of birds will become extinct.]
The second sentence – the conclusion – matches just fine.
Conclusion: Jorge probably believes that the extinctions will occur.
Premise 2 involves a knowledge claim and a possible claim, neither of which appear in the stimulus:
Premise 2: It is widely known that pollution might not be reduced.
b
Bo says that ███ ████ ██ ███ ████████ ██ ██████ ████████ ███ █████ █████████ ██████ ████ ███ ████ ████ ██ ████ ████ ██ ██████ ████████ ██ ████████ ████████ ████ █████████ ██████ ████ ███ ████ ████ ██ ███ █████████
Ideally, you should eliminate all the other answers on your shallow dip, then return to confirm that (B) matches before picking it. And it matches!
Most importantly, (B) matches the stimulus’ facts vs. beliefs flaw – (B)’s argument assumes Jorge is aware raspberry bushes will not grow well in soil that is poorly drained.
The quantifiers and likelihood terms all match as well – there are no “most”s or “might”s here, but there is a “probably” in the conclusion.
c
Wanda says that ██ ████ ██ ████████ █████ ██ ████ ██████████ █████ █████ ████ ██████ ███ ███ ████ ███████ ████ ██████████ ██████ ██ ██████████ █████ ████████ ████████ ████ ██████████ ██████ ██ ██████████
The shallow dip explanation suffices: there are no most claims in the stimulus. This is a quantifier mismatch.
If you want practice tracking this question’s core concepts, though, here’s a full breakdown of (C)’s structure, with matching structural elements italicized and mismatches bolded.
Premise 1 – the first sentence – matches fine except for its conditional structure, which tbh is also fine:
Wanda [believes] that [if something is a] form of coercive force, it is not justified.
Premise 2 – the second sentence – directly links one belief claim to another, which ultimately results in a valid argument. It’s also a “most” claim, though, which is bad.
Most people who believe [no form of coercive force is justified] also believe [government should be abolished].
This “if you believe this, you also believe that” premise supports (C)'s conclusion really well! (C)'s conclusion, by the way, matches the stimulus.
Wanda probably believes [government should be abolished].
d
My chemistry professor ████ ████ ████ ████████ ███ ████ ██ █████ ███ ██ █████████ █████████ █████ ███████ ████ ████ ████████ ███ ████ ██ ██████ █████ ████ ██████ ███ ███ ████ ██ ████ ███ ████ ████ ██ ██████
The shallow dip explanation suffices: there are no most claims or might/possibly claims in the stimulus. These are mismatches in logical strength. Preserving quantifiers (some, most, all) and likelihood indicators (might, probably, definitely) matters a lot in Parallel (and Parallel Flaw) questions.
If you want practice tracking this question’s core concepts, though, here’s a full breakdown of (D)’s structure, with matching structural elements italicized and mismatches bolded.
My chem professor [believes] that [most chemists are good at math].
Most people who are good at math are also good at chess.
My chem professor might believe [most chemists are good at chess].
e
Dr. Bowder says ████ ██████ ██████ █████████ █████ ██████████ ███ █████ ███ █████ ████ ████████ ████████ █████ ███████████ █████████ █████ ██████████ ███ ██████ ████████ ████████ ████ ██████ ██████ █████████ █████ ████████████
The shallow dip explanation suffices: there is no causal language in the stimulus, and there are no knowledge claims in the stimulus.
The knowledge one is the real killer, because knowledge implies fact and belief, which lets (E) dodge the stimulus’ facts vs. belief flaw.
To match the stimulus, (E) should inappropriately assume Dr. Bowder is aware that whatever improves one’s circulation increases one's alertness. But (E)’s Premise 2 explicitly establishes that Dr. Bowder is aware of that fact.
(E) isn’t a valid argument, though. It makes a different error: confusing sufficiency for necessity. (E)’s attempted causal chain looks like this:
Premise 1: Garlic –cause→ Alertness↑
Premise 2: Circulation↑ –cause→ Alertness↑
________
Conclusion: Garlic –cause→ Circulation↑
This would be a valid argument if Premise 2 were flipped back to front.