Every action has consequences, and among the consequences of any action are other actions. ███ ███████ ███████ ██ ██████ ██ ████ ████████ ███████ ███████ ███ ████████████ ███ █████ ███ ██ ██████ ████ ███ ███████ ██ ████ ███████ ███ ███████████
Here’s the argument’s core structured distilled:
P1: Knowing [an action is good] requires knowing [its consequences are good].
P2: It’s impossible to know [consequences are good].*
________
Con: It’s impossible that [any action is good] in fact.
*The argument makes an implicit inference here: we can’t know the future, and consequences are in the future, so it’s impossible to know consequences.
What we have here is an excellent case study in the distinction between knowledge and fact. From the argument’s premises, we could validly infer it’s impossible to know any action is good. But just because we can’t know something doesn’t mean it can’t be true in fact.
In other words, we can anticipate an assumption along these lines:
If we lack [some kind of] knowledge about good actions, then they can’t happen in fact.
If you’ve got a keen eye for this common distinction, you don’t even really need full comprehension of all the stimulus’ claims here. The following was, genuinely, my experience of this question:
- Yikes look at all these complex knowledge claims.
- Oh look, a fact conclusion.
- Lemme check the answer choices for an assumption that says “fact stuff requires knowledge stuff.”
- Oh hell yeah! I found one! Now I don’t have to waste time trying to comprehend all those thorny conditionals.
It’s a lot harder to fully understand the stimulus’ structure and dutifully eliminate all the wrong answers than it is to 1) catch facts v. knowledge, and then 2) recognize it in (E). If you missed this question, that should be your main takeaway.
Which one of the following ██ ██ ██████████ ██ █████ ███ ████████ ████████
Some actions have ████ █████ ███████ ██ █████████████
(A) negated: All actions have consequences beyond just other actions.
(A) is a weaker version of (D). For both answer choices, the reason they’re wrong is that
We can know ████ ████ ███████ ████ █████
(B) might sound good as a counterpoint to the argument. Like “hey what about past actions? Seems like we could know about them, eh?”
But that’s not a necessary assumption. If anything, the truth of (B) would weaken our argument by suggesting some knowledge of good actions is possible.
To know that ██ ██████ ██ ████ ████████ ███████ ████ ██████████ ████ ██████████ ██ ██ ████
The notion of “refraining from performing” actions is entirely absent in the stimulus.
Only actions can ██ ███ ████████████ ██ █████ ████████
(D) negated: Actions can sometimes have consequences beyond just other actions.
(D) is a stronger version of (A). For both answer choices, the reason they’re wrong is that
For an action ██ ██ ████ ██ ████ ██ ████ ██ ████ ████ ██ ██ █████
This is the only answer that spans the gap between knowledge and fact. It says “knowledge of good actions is required for them to be good in fact.”
The stimulus’ premises do imply it’s impossible to know actions are good. But if knowledge of goodness isn’t a requirement for actual goodness (i.e. if we negate (E)), then the conclusion that good actions are impossible in fact loses all its support.